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concordance

attest_record

[CHECK · internal] Bind your identity to a record you already hold — phase 2 of the sovereign flow. Do the thing unsigned (badges_issue, study_export, group_contribute), take the returned content_hash, sign THAT hash with your own key on your own machine, and submit only the attestation {alg, over, content_hash, pubkey, sig}. Never send a private key. Several parties may attest to one record: one signature is a claim, two or three witnesses begin to establish a matter (Deuteronomy 19:15).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
attestationYesthe dict from signing.sign_seal, built locally
content_hashYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
    • addedInput schema / properties / attestation / additionalProperties
      Added value: +false
    • addedInput schema / properties / content_hash / maxLength
      Added value: +4000
  2. Added

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden, and it discloses the security-critical behavior ('Never send a private key') plus the required payload shape and multi-party semantics (one signature is a claim, more begin to establish a matter). It does not describe return values, authorization requirements, or failure modes.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core instruction and the inner/phase marker are front-loaded and dense with actionable content. The closing Deuteronomy reference is thematic rather than operational, but it does encode the multi-witness semantics, so it earns its place for a specialized audience.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no annotations, no output schema, and a 2-param nested payload, the description supplies the flow, the security constraint, and the attestation structure an agent needs. It is nearly complete for the call itself; only the response behavior is left unspecified.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 50% (content_hash has no description), but the description compensates: it explains that content_hash is the value returned from the unsigned phase and that attestation is the locally built dict of shape {alg, over, content_hash, pubkey, sig}. This meaningfully extends what the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Bind your identity to a record you already hold') and frames it as phase 2 of a named flow. It also names the phase-1 siblings (badges_issue, study_export, group_contribute) it follows, so an agent can place it relative to them. It does not, however, contrast with the closest sibling (self_attest) or witnesses.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a concrete workflow: do the thing unsigned, take the returned content_hash, sign it locally, submit only the attestation. It names the alternative tools for the unsigned phase and states the constraint 'Never send a private key.' It stops short of explicit when-not-to-use or a direct contrast with self_attest/witnesses.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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