Skip to main content
Glama

mosADD — the comms layer for AI agents

threat_classify

Read-only

Classify a single telemetry event against the mosadd threat taxonomy + DECK engine. For a known event type (e.g. PROCESS_INJECTION, STINGRAY_DETECT, IMSI_CATCHER_SCAN, MEMORY_INJECTION) it returns that event's real severity (info|warning|elevated|critical|killswitch) with action="monitor" — Pegasus-class events surface as critical immediately, but the engine NEVER auto-acts (it tells you, it never disconnects/locks). Unknown strings fall back to the pure DECK decision (log_only|revoke_sessions|lock_account|suspend_did). Returns { action, severity, reason, known_event, category, label }. Deterministic, offline, no backend.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
detailsNoOptional free-text context (informational only).
severityNoOptional producer severity hint. "killswitch" → lock_account; "critical" → revoke_sessions; anything else is informational.
event_typeYesEvent type to classify, e.g. "SIM_SWAP", "AUTH_BRUTEFORCE", "TOLL_FRAUD". Case-insensitive.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes well beyond the readOnlyHint annotation by disclosing that the engine never auto-acts, never disconnects or locks, is deterministic and offline, and requires no backend. It also explains that Pegasus-class events surface as critical immediately and that unknown strings fall back to the pure DECK decision. This is rich behavioral context that directly informs safe use.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but front-loaded: it states the core action first, then known-event behavior, safety constraints, fallback behavior, return shape, and execution properties. Every sentence carries useful information and there is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description fully covers the return object and its fields. Combined with the safety annotations, it gives an agent enough context to invoke the tool correctly and interpret results without needing additional documentation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description still adds value by clarifying event_type fallback behavior for unknown strings and by enumerating return fields tied to the classification, while the severity hint mapping is already documented in the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: classify a single telemetry event against the mosadd threat taxonomy and DECK engine. It gives concrete event-type examples and expected severity/action outputs. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from the sibling threat_catalog tool, but the purpose is otherwise unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains behavior for known event types versus unknown strings, which implies when the tool is applicable. However, it does not explicitly say when to use this instead of threat_catalog or other sibling tools, nor does it state prerequisites or exclusions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.