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mIRC_approve_request

Approve a pending access request (state=requested → active). Admins / moderators / owner only. Because access requests only exist on non-open (password/private) channels, you must pass wrapped_group_key — the channel group key wrapped to the approved member's identity key.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
channel_idYesChannel id (UUID). From mIRC_list / mIRC_create.
identity_idYesIdentity id of the requester to reject (state=requested; from mIRC_list members).
wrapped_group_keyNoRequired to approve a join to a password/private (group-key) channel: the channel group key wrapped to the approved member's identity key. Without it the backend rejects the approval with a 'wrapped_group_key required' error. (Access requests only exist on non-open channels, so this is effectively always required.)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With only readOnlyHint=false provided, the description carries most of the burden and does so well: it discloses the privilege requirement, the state mutation's effect, and the exact failure mode ("wrapped_group_key required") the backend raises. It stops short of covering idempotency, what happens to the requester on success, or rate limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the action and state transition, then permissions, then the non-obvious parameter constraint. Nothing is padding and the ordering matches how an agent needs the information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a mutating tool with no output schema and minimal annotations, the description covers authority, state effect, mandatory inputs, and failure mode. It omits what a successful call returns and whether re-approving an already-active member errors or is a no-op, which an agent would want before retrying.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, but the description adds real interpretive value by asserting that wrapped_group_key — which is not in the required array — is effectively always required, resolving the ambiguity between the schema's optional marking and actual backend behavior. It also clarifies the key is wrapped to the approved member's identity key.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (approve) plus resource (pending access request) and pins the exact state transition (state=requested → active). An agent can immediately distinguish this from mIRC_reject_request or mIRC_join without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Admins / moderators / owner only" gives an explicit eligibility gate, and the sentence explaining that access requests only exist on non-open channels tells the agent the condition under which wrapped_group_key is mandatory. It never names mIRC_reject_request as the counter-action, so the exclusion path is left implicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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