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Moltline Agent Governance

Inventory Report

inventory_report
Read-onlyIdempotent

Build a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list. FREE.

Turns a list of agents / MCP servers / skills into an audit-ready summary with critical/elevated/standard tiers and unowned-agent flags. Typical input {"items": "[{"name": "deploy-bot", "owner": "ana"}]"} returns {"total": N, "tiers": {"critical": N, ...}, "unowned_agents": [...], "inventory": [{"name": ..., "owner": ..., "tier": ..., "orphaned": bool}], "reading": "...", "note": "..."}.

Use to turn a raw agent list into risk tiers. Not for auditing any single agent in depth (audit_mcp_config, scope_check). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
itemsYesThe fleet as a string (a JSON array of {name, owner?, capabilities?, last_seen?} objects, or plain newline-separated agent names).

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / items / description
      Previous value: -"The fleet as a string — a JSON array of {name, owner?,\ncapabilities?, last_seen?} objects, or plain newline-separated\nagent names."New value: +"The fleet as a string (a JSON array of {name, owner?,\ncapabilities?, last_seen?} objects, or plain newline-separated\nagent names)."
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, it discloses a non-obvious error contract: no protocol error is ever raised, instead an {"error": ...} object is returned, and retry is safe after fixing input. That is genuinely additive. It restates read-only/idempotent which the annotations already cover, so it earns strong but not top marks.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the purpose, then input/output shape, then usage boundary, then error semantics — a sensible ordering with no filler. The inline sample return payload is somewhat verbose given a dedicated output schema already exists, which costs a point.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter, read-only, non-open-world tool with annotations and an output schema, the description covers decision context, error behavior, and input format. The return-value enumeration is largely redundant with the output schema, so it is complete if slightly misallocated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds a concrete worked input example ({"items": "[{\"name\": \"deploy-bot\", \"owner\": \"ana\"}]"}) that clarifies the unusual string-encoded-JSON shape the bare schema leaves ambiguous. Useful disambiguation of an awkward parameter format.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: "Build a governance inventory with risk tiers from a raw agent list," and immediately explains what the transformation produces (tiers, unowned flags). It explicitly differentiates from siblings by naming audit_mcp_config and scope_check as the wrong choice for single-agent depth audits.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Use to turn a raw agent list into risk tiers. Not for auditing any single agent in depth (audit_mcp_config, scope_check)" gives both the selection condition and the exclusion with named alternatives. An agent can route fleet-level vs single-agent work without opening any sibling schema.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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