Moltline Code Review

Security Deep Dive

security_deep_dive

Read-onlyIdempotent

Run an OWASP-oriented security pass over a source file. PREMIUM (license).

Checks injection sinks, auth/session handling, crypto misuse, SSRF/deserialization, and unsafe file/path handling. Each finding cites the line, the OWASP risk class, and a concrete fix direction. Typical input {"code": ""} returns {"issues": N, "findings": [{"line": N, "class": "A03 Injection", "fix": "...", "code": "..."}], "owasp_note": "..."}.

Use on one source file when vulnerabilities are the question. Not for style or structure (complexity_report), and never a substitute for a security professional on high-risk code. Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error; it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "code": "<code>"
    },
    "name": "security_deep_dive"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`code`	Yes	Full source text to audit, pasted as a single string; any common language.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedAug 17, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive, and the description adds value on top: a PREMIUM license requirement, a guarantee that invalid input never raises a protocol error but returns a structured error object, and an explicit retry-safety statement. These are operational traits an agent cannot infer from the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose, then constraints, then error behavior — a sensible order. The inline return-shape JSON is partly redundant given an output schema exists, making the description slightly longer than necessary, but no sentence is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers purpose, exclusions, licensing, error semantics, retry safety, and input shape for a single-parameter tool with annotations and an output schema already in place. An agent has everything needed to decide and to invoke correctly, including what to do on failure.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single required parameter with 100% schema description coverage, so the schema already carries the semantics. The description only echoes it as an input example ('{"code": "<file contents>"}') without adding format, size, or language constraints beyond what the schema states.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Run an OWASP-oriented security pass over a source file') and immediately bounds scope with the enumerated check categories (injection, auth/session, crypto, SSRF/deserialization, path handling). It distinguishes itself from a sibling by naming complexity_report as the tool for style/structure instead.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides an explicit positive condition ('Use on one source file when vulnerabilities are the question'), an explicit exclusion with the alternative named ('Not for style or structure (complexity_report)'), and a caveat about not replacing a human reviewer on high-risk code. The only unmentioned neighbor is secret_scan, but the vulnerability-vs-secret split is implicit in the enumerated check list.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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