Moltline Agent Governance & MCP Auditor

Audit Mcp Config

audit_mcp_config

Read-onlyIdempotent

Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings. FREE.

Flags exposed machine credentials in the config, required inputs that aren't gated/optional, unpinned versions, over-broad env access, and dangerous auto-run flags. It never echoes any matched secret value back. Typical input {"config": "<mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block>"} returns {"posture_score": 0-100, "verdict": "...", "findings": [{"line": N, "severity": 1-5, "issue": "...", "fix": "..."}], "note": "..."}.

Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan). Errors: on invalid, missing, or malformed input this tool never raises a protocol error — it returns {"error": ""}. Every call is read-only and idempotent, so after correcting the input it is always safe to retry.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`config`	Yes	The MCP config to audit, pasted as text or JSON — mcpize.yaml, mcp.json, or a Claude/Cursor servers block.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

TDQS

A4.8/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint=false. Description adds 'FREE', 'never echoes any matched secret value back', and reiterates 'Every call is read-only and idempotent'. No contradiction; description significantly supplements annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Moderately sized but well-structured: purpose first, then flag list, safety note, I/O example, usage guidance, error behavior, idempotency. Every sentence contributes; could possibly tighten the flag list but overall efficient for the detail provided.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the output schema exists (context signals) and the single parameter is fully described, the description covers input format, output structure, error handling, behavioral safety, and appropriate usage context. No gaps remain.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema already provides 100% coverage with a clear description of the 'config' parameter. The description adds a concrete example of typical input structure, which adds value beyond the schema but is not transformative. Baseline 3, adjusted to 4 for the useful example.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Clearly states 'Audit an MCP server config for risk-ranked posture findings.' Lists specific flag types (machine credentials, required inputs, unpinned versions, etc.). Distinguishes from siblings audit_skill_file and injection_scan by naming them and their different targets.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states 'Use on a server configuration document. Not for a skill or instruction file (audit_skill_file) and not for untrusted content an agent is about to read (injection_scan).' Also explains error recovery ('never raises a protocol error...safe to retry').

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.4/5.0

Disambiguation5/5

Every tool has a clearly distinct purpose targeting a different aspect of agent governance: domain readiness, config auditing, skill file auditing, injection scanning, inventory, blast radius scoring, policy generation, and persona loading. Each description explicitly states what the tool is not for, eliminating ambiguity.

Naming Consistency2/5

Naming is inconsistent: some tools start with a verb (audit_mcp_config, get_auditor_persona), others with a noun (agent_readiness_scan, injection_scan, inventory_report, scope_check), and governance_policy is a plain noun phrase with no verb. There is no predictable pattern across the set.

Tool Count5/5

8 tools is well-scoped for the domain of agent governance and auditing. Each tool serves a distinct and necessary function without redundancy, covering readiness, configuration, skill files, injection, inventory, permissions, policy, and persona.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers the major governance activities: audit, scan, inventory, policy generation, and blast radius. A minor gap is the lack of a tool to verify compliance against a generated policy, but the existing audit tools can be used for that purpose.

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