Screen an address against the bundled OFAC-style sanction list; returns the sanctioned flag, any matches and the list size. Pure list lookup. Read-only; price 0.0 (free).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain | No | EVM chain (default: ethereum). | |
| address | Yes | EVM address (0x-hex) |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It discloses that the tool is read-only and free (price 0.0), which covers safety and cost. It does not mention rate limits or error handling, but for a simple list lookup, the transparency is adequate.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely concise, consisting of two sentences that convey purpose, return values, and key traits (read-only, free). No extraneous information, every sentence earns its place.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given no output schema, the description adequately explains return values. It also notes cost and read-only nature. However, with many sibling sanctions tools, it could more clearly differentiate its use case, though it's still fairly complete for a simple tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has 100% coverage, so the description adds minimal value beyond the schema. It provides context about the sanction list but does not enhance understanding of the parameters beyond their schema descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool screens an address against a bundled OFAC-style sanction list and specifies the return values (sanctioned flag, matches, list size). It distinguishes itself from sibling tools by emphasizing it's a pure list lookup and free, which sets it apart from other sanctions screening tools.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context by stating it's a pure list lookup, read-only, and free, implying it's suitable for simple checks. However, it does not explicitly exclude scenarios or mention alternatives, such as when to use other sanctions tools instead.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, especially the ledger-watch groups with domain prefixes. However, there are near-duplicate utilities such as content_authenticity_domain_reputation and domain_intel_reputation, and fx_tax_convert overlaps with price_oracle_fx_rate/convert. The sheer number of tools also increases the chance of selecting the wrong one, though descriptions are generally clear.
The naming is largely consistent with a <domain>_<action> or <domain>_<watch>_<action> pattern, and all names use snake_case. Minor deviations include standalone names like entity_search, kyb_report, verify_receipt, and the confusing singular/plural pair of sanction_watch_* and sanctions_screen_*. Overall, the pattern is predictable.
With 172 tools, this server is far beyond the typical well-scoped range. It bundles dozens of unrelated utility domains (weather, carbon, CVE, geo, etc.) alongside the Japan public-ledger watches, making it unwieldy for an agent to navigate. This extreme count is a major coherence problem.
For the core Japan public-ledger domain, coverage is excellent: each ledger has search, get, timeline, recent_changes, and verify_ledger, plus cross-ledger entity_search and temporal_query. The unrelated utility areas are also fairly complete for their own purposes, but the server's scope is so broad that some utilities are duplicated (e.g., multiple currency converters). Overall, no critical dead ends in the main domain.