Fetch and parse the SPF policy from domain TXT records via DNS-over-HTTPS: presence, raw record, all-qualifier (strict/softfail/neutral/pass) and includes. Accepts a bare domain or a full email address. Read-only; price 0.0 (free).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| No | Email address (its domain is used if domain is omitted) | ||
| domain | No | Domain name (bare host) |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden. It explicitly states 'Read-only; price 0.0 (free)' and details the parsing behavior (all-qualifier strict/softfail/neutral/pass, includes). It does not mention potential DNS failures or rate limits, but for a read-only network operation, the disclosed behavior is strong.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two sentences, front-loaded with the core action and outputs, followed by input flexibility and cost/safety. Every sentence earns its place with no redundant or promotional content.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Although there is no output schema, the description enumerates the key return elements (presence, raw record, all-qualifier, includes), which is essential for a tool with no structured output definition. It covers input forms, method (DNS-over-HTTPS), and cost. It could mention error behavior, but the essential context is present.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds the phrase 'Accepts a bare domain or a full email address,' which is already implied by the schema descriptions for 'email' and 'domain.' Thus, the added value is marginal.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Fetch and parse') and resource ('SPF policy from domain TXT records'), and enumerates the exact outputs: presence, raw record, all-qualifier, includes. This clearly distinguishes it from sibling tools like email_verify_check_mx (MX records) and domain_intel_email_auth_check (broader auth checks).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description states the input flexibility ('Accepts a bare domain or a full email address') and the read-only/free nature, giving clear context for when to use it. However, it does not explicitly name alternative tools or exclusion criteria, though the purpose is sufficiently specific to make usage context clear.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, especially the ledger-watch groups with domain prefixes. However, there are near-duplicate utilities such as content_authenticity_domain_reputation and domain_intel_reputation, and fx_tax_convert overlaps with price_oracle_fx_rate/convert. The sheer number of tools also increases the chance of selecting the wrong one, though descriptions are generally clear.
The naming is largely consistent with a <domain>_<action> or <domain>_<watch>_<action> pattern, and all names use snake_case. Minor deviations include standalone names like entity_search, kyb_report, verify_receipt, and the confusing singular/plural pair of sanction_watch_* and sanctions_screen_*. Overall, the pattern is predictable.
With 172 tools, this server is far beyond the typical well-scoped range. It bundles dozens of unrelated utility domains (weather, carbon, CVE, geo, etc.) alongside the Japan public-ledger watches, making it unwieldy for an agent to navigate. This extreme count is a major coherence problem.
For the core Japan public-ledger domain, coverage is excellent: each ledger has search, get, timeline, recent_changes, and verify_ledger, plus cross-ledger entity_search and temporal_query. The unrelated utility areas are also fairly complete for their own purposes, but the server's scope is so broad that some utilities are duplicated (e.g., multiple currency converters). Overall, no critical dead ends in the main domain.