Fetch multiple CVEs (from NVD) and aggregate a severity distribution and worst-case summary for the set. Read-only; price 0.0 (free).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cveIds | Yes | CVE identifiers to summarize |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It explicitly states 'Read-only; price 0.0 (free)', which adds important safety and cost context. However, it does not disclose other behaviors such as rate limits, error handling, or the exact output format, leaving some gaps.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is highly concise, consisting of two short sentences that front-load the core function and then add a valuable note about read-only/free nature. Every sentence contributes meaning without any waste.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's moderate complexity with one well-documented parameter, the description adequately conveys the high-level output ('severity distribution and worst-case summary'). Since there is no output schema, a bit more detail on return structure would help, but the description covers the essential behavior.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% for the single parameter 'cveIds' ('CVE identifiers to summarize'), so the schema already fully documents the parameter. The description adds no further parameter-specific meaning, matching the baseline for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description specifically states 'Fetch multiple CVEs' and 'aggregate a severity distribution and worst-case summary', which is a clear, specific verb+resource combination. It distinguishes itself from sibling tools like cve_lookup_get_cve by focusing on multiple CVEs and aggregation rather than individual lookups.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context that this tool is for summarizing multiple CVEs into a severity distribution, implying its use case. However, it does not explicitly name alternative tools or state when not to use it, so it lacks exclusions or direct sibling differentiation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, especially the ledger-watch groups with domain prefixes. However, there are near-duplicate utilities such as content_authenticity_domain_reputation and domain_intel_reputation, and fx_tax_convert overlaps with price_oracle_fx_rate/convert. The sheer number of tools also increases the chance of selecting the wrong one, though descriptions are generally clear.
The naming is largely consistent with a <domain>_<action> or <domain>_<watch>_<action> pattern, and all names use snake_case. Minor deviations include standalone names like entity_search, kyb_report, verify_receipt, and the confusing singular/plural pair of sanction_watch_* and sanctions_screen_*. Overall, the pattern is predictable.
With 172 tools, this server is far beyond the typical well-scoped range. It bundles dozens of unrelated utility domains (weather, carbon, CVE, geo, etc.) alongside the Japan public-ledger watches, making it unwieldy for an agent to navigate. This extreme count is a major coherence problem.
For the core Japan public-ledger domain, coverage is excellent: each ledger has search, get, timeline, recent_changes, and verify_ledger, plus cross-ledger entity_search and temporal_query. The unrelated utility areas are also fairly complete for their own purposes, but the server's scope is so broad that some utilities are duplicated (e.g., multiple currency converters). Overall, no critical dead ends in the main domain.