Keyword-search CVEs via the free NVD CVE API 2.0, returning id, base score, severity and published date. Read-only; price 0.0 (free).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Max results to return (optional) | |
| keyword | Yes | Search keyword |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the burden of behavioral disclosure. It explicitly notes 'Read-only' and 'price 0.0 (free)', which are valuable safety/cost details. It doesn't mention rate limits, pagination, or error behavior, but for a simple read-only search tool, the given information is solid.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One compact sentence that conveys action, resource, output, and behavioral attributes without redundancy. All information is meaningful and front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple 2-parameter search tool, the description covers the core: what it does, the data source, the return fields, and its safety profile. It lacks some nuances like match type or rate limits, but given the simplicity and full schema coverage, it is sufficiently complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% (keyword and limit both described). The description adds return-field context (id, base score, severity, published date) which helps infer how keyword affects results, but does not add new parameter-level semantics beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('Keyword-search CVEs'), the resource ('NVD CVE API 2.0'), and the output (id, score, severity, date). This is specific and distinguishes from siblings like cve_lookup_get_cve.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains what the tool does but does not explicitly state when to use it over alternatives or mention any exclusions. The context is clear for a keyword search, but there is no guidance on choosing between this and sibling tools like cve_lookup_get_cve.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, especially the ledger-watch groups with domain prefixes. However, there are near-duplicate utilities such as content_authenticity_domain_reputation and domain_intel_reputation, and fx_tax_convert overlaps with price_oracle_fx_rate/convert. The sheer number of tools also increases the chance of selecting the wrong one, though descriptions are generally clear.
The naming is largely consistent with a <domain>_<action> or <domain>_<watch>_<action> pattern, and all names use snake_case. Minor deviations include standalone names like entity_search, kyb_report, verify_receipt, and the confusing singular/plural pair of sanction_watch_* and sanctions_screen_*. Overall, the pattern is predictable.
With 172 tools, this server is far beyond the typical well-scoped range. It bundles dozens of unrelated utility domains (weather, carbon, CVE, geo, etc.) alongside the Japan public-ledger watches, making it unwieldy for an agent to navigate. This extreme count is a major coherence problem.
For the core Japan public-ledger domain, coverage is excellent: each ledger has search, get, timeline, recent_changes, and verify_ledger, plus cross-ledger entity_search and temporal_query. The unrelated utility areas are also fairly complete for their own purposes, but the server's scope is so broad that some utilities are duplicated (e.g., multiple currency converters). Overall, no critical dead ends in the main domain.