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Lumethic Photo Verification

share_verification

Idempotent

Enable or update sharing for a verification you own. access_type is 'anyone_with_link' (public URL) or 'restricted' (only invited emails). Optionally pass invite_emails to grant access. Returns the share URL and invited emails. Anonymous verifications can't be shared.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
access_typeYes'anyone_with_link' for a public link, 'restricted' for invited email addresses only.
invite_emailsNoEmail addresses to grant access; used with 'restricted'.
verification_idYesVerification id (UUID) as returned by verify_photo, verify_content_credentials or list_verifications.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / access_type / description
      Added value: +"'anyone_with_link' for a public link, 'restricted' for invited email addresses only."
    • addedInput schema / properties / access_type / enum
      Added value: +[
      +  "anyone_with_link",
      +  "restricted"
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / invite_emails / description
      Added value: +"Email addresses to grant access; used with 'restricted'."
    • addedInput schema / properties / verification_id / description
      Added value: +"Verification id (UUID) as returned by verify_photo, verify_content_credentials or list_verifications."
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With annotations already declaring readOnly=false, idempotent=true, and destructive=false, the description adds useful behavior: it returns the share URL and invited emails, and it refuses anonymous verifications. It doesn't specify whether updating restricted sharing replaces or appends invite_emails, so there's a small transparency gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, front-loaded with the operation, then parameter semantics, output, and constraint. Every sentence earns its place with no filler or repetition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers required and optional parameters, allowed access_type values, the anonymous-verification restriction, and the return value, while the output schema covers return shape. It is complete for invocation, though a brief pointer to sibling tools or update/replace semantics would make it fully watertight.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and every parameter already has a description in the schema. The tool description mostly restates those meanings and adds only 'you own' for verification_id, so it meets the baseline but doesn't add significant new parameter insight.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first sentence names a specific operation ('Enable or update sharing') on a specific resource ('a verification you own'), and the access_type sentence defines the two modes. This makes it clear the tool is for creating or modifying sharing, not reading (get_verification_share) or removing (unshare_verification) it.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states when to use the tool and gives an explicit exclusion: anonymous verifications can't be shared. It also says invite_emails is optional and tied to granting access. It doesn't explicitly route to get_verification_share or unshare_verification, so it stops short of full alternative guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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