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Lumethic Photo Verification

share_verification

DestructiveIdempotent

Enable or update sharing for a verification you own. access_type is 'anyone_with_link' (public URL) or 'restricted' (only invited emails). Optionally pass invite_emails to grant access. Returns the share URL and invited emails. Anonymous verifications can't be shared.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
access_typeYes'anyone_with_link' for a public link, 'restricted' for invited email addresses only.
invite_emailsNoEmail addresses to grant access; used with 'restricted'.
verification_idYesVerification id (UUID) as returned by verify_photo, verify_content_credentials or list_verifications.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / access_type / description
      Added value: +"'anyone_with_link' for a public link, 'restricted' for invited email addresses only."
    • addedInput schema / properties / access_type / enum
      Added value: +[
      +  "anyone_with_link",
      +  "restricted"
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / invite_emails / description
      Added value: +"Email addresses to grant access; used with 'restricted'."
    • addedInput schema / properties / verification_id / description
      Added value: +"Verification id (UUID) as returned by verify_photo, verify_content_credentials or list_verifications."
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true and openWorldHint=true, and the description adds real context on top: the ownership requirement, the anonymity restriction, and that 'anyone_with_link' produces a public URL (the actual exposure risk). It doesn't spell out revocation or permission requirements, but the privacy implication of the public mode is disclosed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, no filler, with the core action and the access modes front-loaded ahead of the optional parameter and the constraint.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists and the description notes the return values (share URL and invited emails), so return detail isn't required. Ownership and anonymity constraints are covered; only revocation/undo behavior is unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so both access_type values and the restricted-only use of invite_emails are already documented in the schema; the description largely restates the enum meanings. It adds only marginal framing ('optionally pass invite_emails to grant access'), making the baseline 3 appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (enable/update sharing for a verification) plus a scope constraint (verification you own). It is clearly distinguishable from siblings like unshare_verification and get_verification_share.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explains the two access modes and that invite_emails is optional for granting access, and gives an explicit exclusion (anonymous verifications can't be shared). It doesn't explicitly name unshare_verification/get_verification_share as alternatives for related tasks, so it falls short of a full routing statement.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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