MCP Server By TestMu AI

Delete Uploaded Apps

deleteUploadedApps

Destructive

Delete one or more uploaded apps from TestMu AI by their app IDs.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "appIds": "<appIds>"
    },
    "name": "deleteUploadedApps"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`appIds`	Yes	Array of app IDs to delete (at least one)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed3 schema fields changedOct 16, 2026
- changedInput schema / properties / appIds / description
```
Previous value: -"Array of app IDs to delete"New value: +"Array of app IDs to delete (at least one)"
```
- addedInput schema / properties / appIds / items / minLength
```
Added value: +1
```
- addedInput schema / properties / appIds / minItems
```
Added value: +1
```
First observedOct 5, 2026

TDQS

B3.3/5.0

Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is fully covered by structured data. The description merely restates that this deletes; it adds nothing about irreversibility, partial-failure behavior across multiple IDs, or downstream effects on test runs referencing those apps.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single well-formed sentence with the action verb and scope front-loaded and zero filler. Nothing was cut that should have been kept, but nothing extra was included either.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter destructive tool whose safety hints are in annotations and which has no output schema, the description covers the essentials. Minor gaps remain around how to obtain app IDs and whether deletion is atomic across the array.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the parameter is documented in-schema (array of IDs, minItems 1). The description's phrase 'by their app IDs' reinforces the parameter's role but adds no format or source detail beyond the schema, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (delete), resource (uploaded apps), scope (one or more), and the lookup key (app IDs), which an agent can distinguish from the many get/list/stop siblings. It does not explicitly contrast with the closely related listUploadedApps or deleteBuild/deleteSession, so it stops short of 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the destructive verb on a known resource, but there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance, no mention that IDs come from listUploadedApps, and no warning about irreversibility. The agent must infer the workflow.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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