Remove PDF Watermark — Attempt to remove an existing watermark layer from a PDF. [category: pdf]
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| file | Yes | Input file (PDF) | |
| passthrough | No | Some watermarks are painted into the page and cannot be lifted out. Left off, the step stops with an error when that happens. Switch it on and the file is passed through untouched so the rest of the workflow still runs. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / passthroughAdded value: +{
+ "default": false,
+ "description": "Some watermarks are painted into the page and cannot be lifted out. Left off, the step stops with an error when that happens. Switch it on and the file is passed through untouched so the rest of the workflow still runs.",
+ "title": "Carry on if there is nothing to remove",
+ "type": "boolean"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations declare readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false, so the agent already knows this mutates the file without destroying it. The description's honest 'Attempt to remove' hedge adds a little value by signaling the operation may fail, but it doesn't disclose what happens to the original, whether output replaces or copies the input, or auth/permission needs.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single front-loaded sentence with no filler; the '[category: pdf]' tag is redundant metadata rather than useful content, a minor blemish on an otherwise tight description.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple two-parameter mutation tool with no output schema and annotations covering the safety profile, the description is adequate. It is thin on return behavior and prerequisites, but the schema's passthrough field carries the important failure-mode context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and both parameters are fully documented in the schema, so the description has no parameter burden. It adds nothing beyond the schema, making the baseline 3 appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (remove) and resource (PDF watermark layer), which cleanly distinguishes it from the add-watermark siblings (pdf_watermark, media_add_watermark, photo_watermark). It does not explicitly name those alternatives, but the verb contrast makes the purpose unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description offers no when-to-use guidance, prerequisites, or routing against alternatives; the only operational context (failure on painted-in watermarks) lives in the schema's passthrough description, not the tool description. An agent gets no help from the description itself about when this is the right call.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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