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pdf_protect

Password-Protect PDF — Add a password to a PDF to prevent unauthorised opening or printing. [category: pdf]

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
fileYesInput PDF (max 25MB)
passwordYesSets BOTH the user and owner password. May be omitted only when userPassword or ownerPassword is provided instead.
encryptionNoEncryption strength.aes256
outputNameNoOptional custom output filename.
permissionsNoComma-separated permissions to ALLOW: print, copy, edit, modify, annotate, all. Empty = pdfcpu defaults.
userPasswordNoOptional separate open (user) password.
ownerPasswordNoOptional separate permissions (owner) password.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already indicate readOnly=false and destructive=false. The description adds the functional effect of preventing opening or printing, but it does not disclose whether the tool creates a new protected PDF, overwrites the input, or what happens to existing passwords/permissions.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is concise and front-loaded, with the core action stated immediately. The opening phrase repeats the tool name and '[category: pdf]' is minor metadata, but there is no meaningful padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a mutating tool with no output schema, the description is thin on outcome: it doesn't state what a successful call returns or whether output is a new file. The schema covers parameters well, so this is adequate but has clear gaps around result and side effects.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the schema already explains file size, password semantics, encryption, and permissions. The description adds no parameter-level meaning, so the schema carries the full burden as expected.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific action ('Add a password') and resource ('a PDF'), and clarifies the intended effect: preventing unauthorised opening or printing. It does not explicitly contrast with siblings like pdf_unlock, but the protect/unprotect distinction is reasonably inferable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies when to use the tool (when a PDF needs password protection) but provides no explicit when-not guidance or references to alternative tools such as pdf_unlock. No prerequisites or exclusions are mentioned.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

Multiple tool pairs are near-identical: octopus_mkdir/octopus_make_folder and octopus_move/octopus_move_file are literal duplicates, analyze_hash/generate_hash both compute hashes, convert_word_to_pdf overlaps convert_document, and photo_compress/photo_compress_to_size plus pdf_thumbnails/pdf_to_images have fuzzy boundaries. The descriptions are detailed and cross-reference each other helpfully, but at 144 tools an agent will regularly misselect.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dominant {category}_{verb}_{object} snake_case pattern (pdf_*, photo_*, convert_*, analyze_*, media_*) is largely consistent and predictable. However, outliers like chatwithyourpdf and describe_image break the category-prefix convention, and the octopus namespace mixes bare verbs (read, write, mkdir) with verb_noun forms (make_folder, move_file, search_meta) inconsistently.

Tool Count2/5

144 tools is an extreme count for any MCP server. The broad scope (PDF, photo, video, audio, conversion, analysis, generation, file storage, web, e-sign) justifies some volume, but the count is inflated by batch and inspect variants (pdf_to_excel + batch + inspect), duplicate tools, and overlapping converters. An agent faces an overwhelming selection surface.

Completeness4/5

Per-domain coverage is remarkably deep: PDF spans merge/split/compress/protect/unlock/metadata/OCR/watermark and bidirectional conversion; photo covers editing, format conversion, face handling, OCR, and collage; file storage has full CRUD plus search. Minor gaps exist (no audio transcription, no video metadata editing, no deletion of PDF pages is actually covered via pdf_delete_pages) but the surface has no dead ends for its declared domains.

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