PDF E-Signature — Place signature, initial, date or text fields onto a PDF — draw or type a signature — and (Pro+) append a cryptographic ed25519 audit trail. Free tier: 3 signed documents per month. [category: sign]
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| file | Yes | PDF to sign | |
| fields | Yes | JSON array of field placements: [{page,x,y,w,h,type,value,font_size,image_b64}] |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already establish that the tool is not read-only and not destructive. The description adds useful behavior context: the Pro+ ed25519 audit trail and the free-tier limit of 3 signed documents per month. It does not state whether the original file is overwritten or how quota exhaustion is handled, but the annotation baseline lowers the burden.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is compact and front-loaded with the core action, followed by quota and category context. The 'PDF E-Signature' opener is slightly redundant with the title, and the category tag adds mild noise, but every sentence contributes useful information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, the description does not explain what the tool returns (e.g., signed PDF bytes or a file reference) or how quota-exceeded attempts behave. It also leaves unclear whether the input PDF is modified in place or a new file is produced. However, the input schema is fully covered and the quota/audit context is present, making the core invocation mostly understandable.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already documents the two parameters and the fields JSON structure at 100% coverage. The description adds meaning by enumerating the expected field types (signature, initial, date, text) and indicating draw-or-type signature input, which clarifies plausible values for 'type' and 'image_b64'. It does not document coordinate units or other per-field constraints, so it is not a 5.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a concrete verb ('Place') and names the PDF as the target, listing the supported field types (signature, initial, date, text) and signature input modes (draw or type). It is clearly distinct from PDF conversion and analysis tools, though it does not explicitly differentiate itself from the sibling esign_prepare, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no explicit guidance about when to use this tool versus alternatives such as esign_prepare or other PDF tools. The free-tier cap is a constraint, not a usage rule, and no exclusion conditions or alternative recommendations are provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Multiple tool pairs are near-identical: octopus_mkdir/octopus_make_folder and octopus_move/octopus_move_file are literal duplicates, analyze_hash/generate_hash both compute hashes, convert_word_to_pdf overlaps convert_document, and photo_compress/photo_compress_to_size plus pdf_thumbnails/pdf_to_images have fuzzy boundaries. The descriptions are detailed and cross-reference each other helpfully, but at 144 tools an agent will regularly misselect.
The dominant {category}_{verb}_{object} snake_case pattern (pdf_*, photo_*, convert_*, analyze_*, media_*) is largely consistent and predictable. However, outliers like chatwithyourpdf and describe_image break the category-prefix convention, and the octopus namespace mixes bare verbs (read, write, mkdir) with verb_noun forms (make_folder, move_file, search_meta) inconsistently.
144 tools is an extreme count for any MCP server. The broad scope (PDF, photo, video, audio, conversion, analysis, generation, file storage, web, e-sign) justifies some volume, but the count is inflated by batch and inspect variants (pdf_to_excel + batch + inspect), duplicate tools, and overlapping converters. An agent faces an overwhelming selection surface.
Per-domain coverage is remarkably deep: PDF spans merge/split/compress/protect/unlock/metadata/OCR/watermark and bidirectional conversion; photo covers editing, format conversion, face handling, OCR, and collage; file storage has full CRUD plus search. Minor gaps exist (no audio transcription, no video metadata editing, no deletion of PDF pages is actually covered via pdf_delete_pages) but the surface has no dead ends for its declared domains.
