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ScorpTech x402 Tools

Prompt Injection Scan

prompt_injection_scan
Read-onlyIdempotent

Offline prompt-injection / jailbreak / exfiltration scanner: 10 rule families (ignore-instructions, reveal-system, role-hijack, delimiter-escape, tool/secret dump, encoding smuggle, policy bypass, authority claim, continuation trap, multilingual) plus hidden-Unicode and long-base64 heuristics. Returns verdict (clean|suspicious|critical), 0-100 score and match spans. Batch up to 20 texts. Price: $0.005 USDC per successful call (x402, Solana). Same tool over HTTPS: POST https://scorptech.it.com/api/x402/v1/prompt-injection-scan

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
textNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the read-only, idempotent, non-destructive profile, and the description adds genuinely non-obvious context: the call costs $0.005 USDC via x402 on Solana, and the same capability is reachable over HTTPS at the given endpoint. It also discloses the return shape (verdict, 0-100 score, match spans), though rate limits and whether payment is charged on failure-to-scan remain unstated.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Capability and rule families are front-loaded, and pricing plus the HTTPS mirror are appended as clearly secondary facts. The dense parenthetical rule list is efficient, though the batch/pricing/URL tail could be trimmed slightly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description does well to state the verdict/score/span return fields, and it flags the cost model. However the unresolved single-vs-batch input question and the absence of any input-size or content-preparation guidance leave a real gap for a one-parameter tool with zero schema documentation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0% and the sole 'text' parameter is undocumented in the schema, so the description must compensate — but instead it introduces 'Batch up to 20 texts' while the schema accepts only a single string, leaving the caller unsure whether to pass one item or a JSON array. No guidance on input length limits or expected raw-user-message format is given.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (prompt-injection / jailbreak / exfiltration scanner) and enumerates the ten rule families and heuristics it applies, which is far more specific than any sibling (pii_detect, phishing_score, sentiment). An agent can tell immediately this is a text-safety classifier, not a reputation or PII tool.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The word 'offline' and the framing around scanning prompt text imply when it applies, but there is no explicit when-to-use / when-not guidance and no naming of alternatives such as pii_detect or phishing_score. An agent must infer that this is the tool for untrusted LLM input rather than being told.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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