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ScorpTech x402 Tools

Password Strength

password_strength
Read-onlyIdempotent

Offline password strength audit (POST only, so the password never appears in a URL or access log; never echoed or stored): zxcvbn-style score 0-4, estimated guesses and entropy, crack-time estimates, weak patterns (common/breached passwords incl. l33t and reversed, keyboard walks, sequences, repeats, dates, personal info) and NIST SP 800-63B checks. Body: { "password": "...", "user_inputs"?: ["alice", "alice@example.com"] }. Price: $0.005 USDC per successful call (x402, Solana). Same tool over HTTPS: POST https://scorptech.it.com/api/x402/v1/password-strength

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
passwordYesPassword to evaluate, 1-256 chars (JSON body only; never returned)
user_inputsNoOptional personal context (username, email, name) that should not appear in the password

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnly/idempotent annotations, it discloses privacy behavior (never echoed or stored, POST-only transport rationale), pricing ($0.005 USDC per successful call via x402 on Solana), and an alternate transport URL. These are exactly the operational facts an agent needs and that structured fields don't carry; no contradiction with readOnlyHint=true.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core purpose and privacy guarantee are front-loaded, and the semicolon-separated clauses each carry distinct facts (outputs, body shape, price, alternate endpoint). It is dense but not padded; a slightly lighter touch on enumerating every pattern type would make it crisper.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description fully enumerates the return contents (score, guesses, entropy, crack times, weak patterns, NIST checks) and covers inputs, privacy, and payment. An agent has everything needed to call it correctly and interpret the result.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds a concrete body example ({password, user_inputs: ['alice','alice@example.com']}) that demonstrates how personal context feeds the weak-pattern checks. That's modest added meaning over the schema's own field descriptions, not a full explanation of constraints.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource ('Offline password strength audit') and enumerates the exact outputs (zxcvbn 0-4 score, guesses, entropy, crack time, weak patterns, NIST 800-63B checks). This clearly separates it from nearby tools like pii_detect or phishing_score without needing the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It establishes the operative context (offline audit, POST-only so the password never hits a URL/log) and even offers a parallel HTTPS endpoint for agents that can't use x402. It doesn't state when-not-to-use or name sibling alternatives, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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