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Immersive Commons

by com.immersivecommons

The event photo gallery (and the download links)

ic_hack_photos_list

Every published photo from the event, with a download link for the full-size edited file and a smaller preview link. THE LINKS ARE GATED, NOT PUBLIC: each one is an authenticated route, so fetch it with the same bearer token you called this tool with — an anonymous GET returns 403, and that is the point rather than a bug. Blob URLs are deliberately never returned. WHO GETS IN: anyone holding a live IC agent token — you do not need to have been at the event, so an agent can pull the whole set on its own. People who WERE there see more: organisers, event admins and volunteers get submissions still awaiting review under also_visible_to_you, and a participant sees their OWN submissions there in whatever state they are in, so a rejection is visible to the person it happened to instead of silently absent. A partner with no account at all can be let in with a signed expiring link an organiser mints. kind says who shot it — official is the organiser edit, submitted came from an attendee. Args: { eid?, include_mine? }. via tells you which of those you are: staff / roster / member / grant. Returns: { ok, eid, via, count, photos[], also_visible_to_you? }. Required scope: hack:read (any tier). No seat required.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
eidNo
include_mineNoInclude your own not-yet-published submissions. Default true.

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations provide no positive safety hints, so the description carries that burden. It discloses gated links, the bearer-token requirement, intentional 403 for anonymous requests, no blob URLs, role-based visibility differences, and the meaning of 'via' and 'kind'. These are rich behavioral facts beyond the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but every paragraph adds non-obvious security or role information, and the core purpose is front-loaded in the first sentence. The CAPS section headers and structured return/scope lines make it scannable rather than bloated.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema and flat false annotations, the description still supplies the full return shape, argument summary, scope requirement, authentication behavior, and role-based visibility rules. An agent has enough context to call the tool and interpret results even in a complex authorization model.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 50%: include_mine has a description but eid does not. The description mentions both args as optional and connects include_mine behavior to role visibility, but it never defines what eid selects or what happens when it is omitted. It partially compensates but leaves a real gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool lists every published photo from the event with both full-size and preview download links. It distinguishes itself from sibling photo tools by focusing on the published gallery and explicitly describing what is returned.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It provides clear access context: who can call it, that a bearer token is required, that anonymous GET returns 403, that no seat is required, and that the required scope is hack:read. It does not explicitly name alternative sibling tools for when-not-to-use, but the usage context is very clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are clearly scoped to distinct actions (e.g., ic_hack_apply vs. ic_hack_register, ic_rooms_create vs. ic_rooms_join). A few pairs could confuse an agent: floor10_submit_highlight vs. floorcast_push both submit HighlightStories but to different queues, and ic_directory_search / ic_agent_directory_lookup / ic_admin_list_members overlap in searching members. Overall, the long descriptions help disambiguate, but the volume requires careful reading.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dominant pattern is ic_<domain>_<verb>_<object> (e.g., ic_admin_list_pending_events, ic_headsets_checkout), but there are notable deviations: floor10_* and floorcast_* prefixes break the ic_ convention, and a few tools use noun-style names (ic_health, ic_capabilities, ic_donations_total). Verb placement also varies (get_* vs *_get, e.g., ic_get_my_membership vs. ic_membership_set_profile). Still, most names are readable and predictable.

Tool Count1/5

175 tools is an extreme count for a single MCP server, far beyond the 50+ threshold that indicates an unwieldy surface. While the platform covers many domains (events, files, hackathon, headsets, prints, rooms, etc.), bundling everything into one server makes discovery and selection difficult. This would be better split into several narrowly-scoped servers.

Completeness4/5

The tool set covers nearly every lifecycle for each domain: CRUD for files/folders, full hackathon admissions and judging, headset lending with waivers and incidents, print farm submission and handoffs, and room coordination. Minor gaps exist: no delete for files/folders, no cancel for events, and some actions (like revoking a Z.ai key or tearing down a room) are explicitly left to human console use. Overall, the surface is remarkably comprehensive for the stated scope.

Resources