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Upload a file to the secure vault (member)

ic_files_put
Idempotent

Upload a file (base64) into the IC secure vault and set who can see it. visibility: 'ic-members' (any IC member, default), 'grantees' (only the Clerk user ids you list, plus you + operators), or 'private' (only you + operators). Non-members get access via ic_files_grant (a signed link). SIZE — the real ceiling on THIS tool is ~3.2MB of RAW bytes, not the 16MB the storage backend accepts: content_base64 travels in a JSON request body through a serverless function capped at ~4.5MB, and base64 inflates 4/3. Measure the raw file, not the encoded string. Over that you get a 413 from the edge with no body, which reads like a network fault but is a hard limit — so check the size yourself before encoding. For anything larger (a 20MB meeting recording, say) split it and upload the parts, or trim the media first; there is no direct-to-blob upload ticket yet. 500 files per member. Args: { filename, content_base64, content_type?, visibility?, grantees?: string[], label?, description?, tags?: string[] }. Returns: { ok, id, filename, size, visibility }. Required scope: files:write (ic-member+).

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tagsNoFree-text tags, e.g. ['hackathon'].
labelNoHuman title (defaults to filename).
filenameYesDisplay filename (basename; sanitized).
granteesNoClerk user ids allowed when visibility='grantees'.
folder_idNoPut the file in this folder (d_...) instead of the vault root. You must own the folder (or be operator). Discover/create folders with ic_folders_list / ic_folder_create.
visibilityNoWho can download. Default 'ic-members'.
descriptionNoWhat the file is.
content_typeNoMIME type, e.g. application/pdf.
content_base64YesFile bytes, base64-encoded. Max ~3.2MB DECODED (the request-body cap is ~4.5MB and base64 adds 4/3). Check the raw size before encoding.

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes well beyond the annotations by disclosing the real 3.2MB decoded byte ceiling, the 4.5MB JSON body cap, the 4/3 base64 inflation, the misleading 413 error with no body, the 500-file quota, and the absence of a no-batch upload path. These details address likely failure modes and not just the happy path.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense and front-loaded with the core action. It is longer than typical, but nearly every sentence adds non-obvious, actionable context. Only small redundancy with schema (duplicating Args) keeps it from a perfect score.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given there is no output schema, the description compensates by stating the return shape, required scope, quota, size limits, and fallback paths. All essential information an agent would need to decide if this is the right tool and call it correctly is present.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

While schema coverage is 100%, the description adds meaning by explaining the raw-vs-encoded size nuance for content_base64 and detailing what each visibility value actually controls. It even clarifies the visibility semantics beyond what the schema enum provides. I deduct a little because the textual Args list omits folder_id, though the schema covers it.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description begins with a clear verb-action pair, 'Upload a file... into the IC secure vault', immediately stating the tool's resource and effect. It also distinguishes this tool from siblings like ic_files_grant, ic_files_get, and ic_files_update by emphasizing 'upload' and visibility semantics.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly routes non-member access to ic_files_grant, large files to splitting/trimming, and documents the required scope files:write. It also tells the agent when NOT to use this tool ('no direct-to-blob upload ticket yet') and how to handle a 20MB recording.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are clearly scoped to distinct actions (e.g., ic_hack_apply vs. ic_hack_register, ic_rooms_create vs. ic_rooms_join). A few pairs could confuse an agent: floor10_submit_highlight vs. floorcast_push both submit HighlightStories but to different queues, and ic_directory_search / ic_agent_directory_lookup / ic_admin_list_members overlap in searching members. Overall, the long descriptions help disambiguate, but the volume requires careful reading.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dominant pattern is ic_<domain>_<verb>_<object> (e.g., ic_admin_list_pending_events, ic_headsets_checkout), but there are notable deviations: floor10_* and floorcast_* prefixes break the ic_ convention, and a few tools use noun-style names (ic_health, ic_capabilities, ic_donations_total). Verb placement also varies (get_* vs *_get, e.g., ic_get_my_membership vs. ic_membership_set_profile). Still, most names are readable and predictable.

Tool Count1/5

175 tools is an extreme count for a single MCP server, far beyond the 50+ threshold that indicates an unwieldy surface. While the platform covers many domains (events, files, hackathon, headsets, prints, rooms, etc.), bundling everything into one server makes discovery and selection difficult. This would be better split into several narrowly-scoped servers.

Completeness4/5

The tool set covers nearly every lifecycle for each domain: CRUD for files/folders, full hackathon admissions and judging, headset lending with waivers and incidents, print farm submission and handoffs, and room coordination. Minor gaps exist: no delete for files/folders, no cancel for events, and some actions (like revoking a Z.ai key or tearing down a room) are explicitly left to human console use. Overall, the surface is remarkably comprehensive for the stated scope.