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Reply to / decide on an agent-inbox thread

ic_agent_inbox_reply

Act on a thread you are a party to (recipient or original sender): accept / decline / counter-propose / clarify / withdraw. Writes a reply envelope and transitions thread state per the state machine. accept→CONFIRMED, decline→DECLINED, counter→OFFERED (carries proposed_windows on a meeting_request), withdraw→DROPPED (only valid from REQUESTED — the sender retracting before the recipient acts), clarify→adds an envelope WITHOUT a state change. Caller must be a thread party (else 'not_a_party'); terminal threads refuse ('thread_terminal'); a decision invalid for the current state returns 'invalid_for_state'. The actor member_id is taken from the token. Args: { thread_id: string (thr_), decision: 'accept'|'decline'|'counter'|'clarify'|'withdraw', message?: string ≤2000, proposed_windows?: [{ start: ISO, end: ISO, tz_hint?: string }] }. Returns: { ok, envelope_id, new_state }. Required scope: agent:thread:write. v1 — the token's scope is the operator's standing consent; per-action autonomy approval is a fast-follow.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
messageNoOptional human note carried on the reply envelope. Sanitized + length-capped server-side.
decisionYesaccept→CONFIRMED · decline→DECLINED · counter→OFFERED (meeting_request: include proposed_windows) · clarify→envelope-only, no transition · withdraw→DROPPED (sender-side, only from REQUESTED).
thread_idYesThread id (thr_<base32>) from list_threads / get_thread.
proposed_windowsNoFor decision=counter on a meeting_request: the new window options.

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description thoroughly explains the state transitions (accept→CONFIRMED, etc.), error conditions, that it is a write operation (readOnlyHint=false), and that the actor member_id is taken from the token. Annotations are consistent and description adds significant behavioral context beyond annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the core purpose and decision options, then provides state machine details, error conditions, parameter summary, return shape, and scope. It is informative but slightly dense; could be more concise, but every sentence adds value.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given no output schema, the return value is described briefly (ok, envelope_id, new_state). The description covers state machine, errors, authorization (scope requirement), and parameter details. It is sufficiently complete for an agent to understand usage and behavior.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% with each parameter described. The description adds further context, e.g., for decision enum it specifies the state transitions and that proposed_windows should be included for meeting_request counter. This enhances understanding beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states it is for acting on a thread as a party, listing specific decisions (accept/decline/counter/clarify/withdraw) and how they affect thread state. It is distinct from siblings like ic_agent_inbox_send_envelope which also writes envelopes but has different purpose.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly states that the caller must be a thread party, and lists error conditions (not_a_party, thread_terminal, invalid_for_state). It does not provide an explicit alternative tool for different actions, but the constraints are clear enough to guide appropriate usage.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are clearly scoped to distinct actions (e.g., ic_hack_apply vs. ic_hack_register, ic_rooms_create vs. ic_rooms_join). A few pairs could confuse an agent: floor10_submit_highlight vs. floorcast_push both submit HighlightStories but to different queues, and ic_directory_search / ic_agent_directory_lookup / ic_admin_list_members overlap in searching members. Overall, the long descriptions help disambiguate, but the volume requires careful reading.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dominant pattern is ic_<domain>_<verb>_<object> (e.g., ic_admin_list_pending_events, ic_headsets_checkout), but there are notable deviations: floor10_* and floorcast_* prefixes break the ic_ convention, and a few tools use noun-style names (ic_health, ic_capabilities, ic_donations_total). Verb placement also varies (get_* vs *_get, e.g., ic_get_my_membership vs. ic_membership_set_profile). Still, most names are readable and predictable.

Tool Count1/5

175 tools is an extreme count for a single MCP server, far beyond the 50+ threshold that indicates an unwieldy surface. While the platform covers many domains (events, files, hackathon, headsets, prints, rooms, etc.), bundling everything into one server makes discovery and selection difficult. This would be better split into several narrowly-scoped servers.

Completeness4/5

The tool set covers nearly every lifecycle for each domain: CRUD for files/folders, full hackathon admissions and judging, headset lending with waivers and incidents, print farm submission and handoffs, and room coordination. Minor gaps exist: no delete for files/folders, no cancel for events, and some actions (like revoking a Z.ai key or tearing down a room) are explicitly left to human console use. Overall, the surface is remarkably comprehensive for the stated scope.