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Find addressable IC members + their inbox posture

ic_agent_directory_lookup
Read-only

Search the member directory (floor roster + canonical members) for members you could address, annotated BOTH with the recipient's posture and with what YOUR token can actually reach. Recipient side: inbox_status (open/closed) and accepted_intents (best-effort: which intent types their policy will entertain; empty when closed). Caller side: reachable_intents (of those, the ones you hold the send-side scope for), blocked_intents ([{ intent, needs_scope }] for the ones you do not, naming the scope that would unlock each), and addressable_by_you. READ addressable_by_you, NOT inbox_status, before planning a send: the send-side intent scopes are tier-gated, so an inbox can be genuinely open and still refuse you, and inbox_status alone cannot tell 'open to everyone' from 'open, but not to you'. Adding a scope means minting a new token; scopes cannot be added to an existing one. This is a routing HINT, not the authoritative decision; the policy engine still evaluates the real envelope. Closed-inbox members are still returned so you see they exist. Args: { query: string (2-80 chars), limit?: number (default 20, max 50) }. Returns: { ok, query, count, caller_send_scopes, results: [{ member_id, member_name, inbox_status, accepted_intents, reachable_intents, blocked_intents, addressable_by_you }] }. Required scope: agent:directory:read.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoDefault 20, max 50.
queryYesName / display-name / member-id fragment, 2-80 chars.

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the readOnlyHint annotation, the description discloses substantial behavioral details: closed-inbox members are still returned, scopes are per-token and cannot be added, and this is a routing hint versus the authoritative policy engine. It also explains the tier-gating of send-side scopes and the distinction between inbox_status and addressable_by_you. No contradiction with annotations—much added value.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but densely packed with critical information. It front-loads the purpose and the crucial warning about reading 'addressable_by_you' early, then details the fields, scope behavior, and output structure. Every sentence serves a purpose; the length is justified by the tool's complexity. It is not merely verbose—it is well-structured, though a bit long.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

The description covers all necessary aspects: purpose, field semantics (both recipient and caller sides), intended usage (which field to read), behavioral caveats (scope minting, routing hint, closed-inbox inclusion), required scope, and a full output schema description. Given the tool's complexity, nothing critical is missing—this is a complete definition.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has 100% description coverage for both parameters, providing the exact semantics (query as name fragment, limit bounds). The description merely repeats the same constraints (e.g., 'query: string (2-80 chars)') without adding new meaning. Per the rubric, baseline is 3 when schema coverage is high and description adds no extra context.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool searches the member directory for members you could address, and specifies the resource (floor roster + canonical members) and the dual annotation (recipient posture and caller reachability). It distinguishes itself from generic directory tools by focusing on addressability and scope. This is a specific verb+resource, not a tautology.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives strong usage guidance: it explicitly instructs to read 'addressable_by_you' rather than 'inbox_status' before planning a send, and explains why. It also notes this is a routing hint, not the authoritative decision. However, it does not explicitly name an alternative tool or state when NOT to use this tool (e.g., for authoritative policy checks), though the policy engine reference implies it. This is clear context but lacks explicit exclusions for a full 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are clearly scoped to distinct actions (e.g., ic_hack_apply vs. ic_hack_register, ic_rooms_create vs. ic_rooms_join). A few pairs could confuse an agent: floor10_submit_highlight vs. floorcast_push both submit HighlightStories but to different queues, and ic_directory_search / ic_agent_directory_lookup / ic_admin_list_members overlap in searching members. Overall, the long descriptions help disambiguate, but the volume requires careful reading.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dominant pattern is ic_<domain>_<verb>_<object> (e.g., ic_admin_list_pending_events, ic_headsets_checkout), but there are notable deviations: floor10_* and floorcast_* prefixes break the ic_ convention, and a few tools use noun-style names (ic_health, ic_capabilities, ic_donations_total). Verb placement also varies (get_* vs *_get, e.g., ic_get_my_membership vs. ic_membership_set_profile). Still, most names are readable and predictable.

Tool Count1/5

175 tools is an extreme count for a single MCP server, far beyond the 50+ threshold that indicates an unwieldy surface. While the platform covers many domains (events, files, hackathon, headsets, prints, rooms, etc.), bundling everything into one server makes discovery and selection difficult. This would be better split into several narrowly-scoped servers.

Completeness4/5

The tool set covers nearly every lifecycle for each domain: CRUD for files/folders, full hackathon admissions and judging, headset lending with waivers and incidents, print farm submission and handoffs, and room coordination. Minor gaps exist: no delete for files/folders, no cancel for events, and some actions (like revoking a Z.ai key or tearing down a room) are explicitly left to human console use. Overall, the surface is remarkably comprehensive for the stated scope.