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Register a class-B agent-client integration (operator)

ic_admin_agent_client_register

Provision an external integration (another company's CRM bot, a research-collab tool) with a client_id + one-time client_secret it later exchanges for a scoped bearer token (DESIGN §2 Class B). Operator-only: gates on admin:agent_clients AND a live operator-tier re-check. The plaintext secret is returned EXACTLY ONCE (only its hash is stored) — a lost secret means re-register. Grantable scopes are limited to the agent:* family (directory:read / request_meeting / send_intro / ping / thread:write / inbox:read / policy:read); any other requested scope (esp. admin:*) is REFUSED and listed in denied_scopes. Args: { name, operator_human, scopes: string[], contact, autonomy?, requires_signature?, budget_overrides? }. Returns: { ok, client_id, client_secret_once, client }. Required scope: admin:agent_clients.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesDisplay name of the integration (e.g. 'Skew meeting bot').
scopesYesExplicitly-enumerated scopes — must be a non-empty subset of the grantable agent:* family. Non-grantable scopes are refused (denied_scopes).
contactYesContact for the operator-of-record (email / handle / URL) so a revoke decision has a human to reach.
operator_humanYesThe human operator-of-record who vouches for this integration.
requires_signatureNoWhen true, the eventual bearer must ALSO carry a valid Ed25519 signature (the pubkey is bound at grant time).

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description provides extensive behavioral details beyond the annotations: operator-only, scope restrictions (only agent:* family), secret returned exactly once, hash storage, denied_scopes listing, and refusal of admin:* scopes. This adds significant value beyond the minimal annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is somewhat lengthy but each sentence adds unique value. It is front-loaded with the core purpose and provides a logical flow: what it does, restrictions, behavior, and return format. Could be slightly more concise but remains clear.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the complexity of the tool, the description is complete. It explains the return format (ok, client_id, client_secret_once, client), the one-time nature of the secret, and the scope denial behavior. No output schema is present, so the description adequately covers what the agent needs to know.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema coverage is 100% for the parameters listed in the schema. The description adds meaning by explaining the purpose of each parameter (e.g., contact for revoke decision, scopes limitations). However, there is a minor inconsistency: the description mentions 'autonomy?' and 'budget_overrides?' as optional args but they are not in the input schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The title and description clearly state the purpose: 'Register a class-B agent-client integration (operator)'. The description specifies the verb 'Provision' and the resource 'external integration', and distinguishes from sibling tools like ic_admin_agent_client_list and ic_admin_agent_client_revoke.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly states it is 'Operator-only', requires scope 'admin:agent_clients', and mentions a 'live operator-tier re-check'. It provides context on when to use (registering external integrations) and hints at limitations (secret returned once). However, it does not explicitly mention when not to use or suggest alternatives.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are clearly scoped to distinct actions (e.g., ic_hack_apply vs. ic_hack_register, ic_rooms_create vs. ic_rooms_join). A few pairs could confuse an agent: floor10_submit_highlight vs. floorcast_push both submit HighlightStories but to different queues, and ic_directory_search / ic_agent_directory_lookup / ic_admin_list_members overlap in searching members. Overall, the long descriptions help disambiguate, but the volume requires careful reading.

Naming Consistency3/5

The dominant pattern is ic_<domain>_<verb>_<object> (e.g., ic_admin_list_pending_events, ic_headsets_checkout), but there are notable deviations: floor10_* and floorcast_* prefixes break the ic_ convention, and a few tools use noun-style names (ic_health, ic_capabilities, ic_donations_total). Verb placement also varies (get_* vs *_get, e.g., ic_get_my_membership vs. ic_membership_set_profile). Still, most names are readable and predictable.

Tool Count1/5

175 tools is an extreme count for a single MCP server, far beyond the 50+ threshold that indicates an unwieldy surface. While the platform covers many domains (events, files, hackathon, headsets, prints, rooms, etc.), bundling everything into one server makes discovery and selection difficult. This would be better split into several narrowly-scoped servers.

Completeness4/5

The tool set covers nearly every lifecycle for each domain: CRUD for files/folders, full hackathon admissions and judging, headset lending with waivers and incidents, print farm submission and handoffs, and room coordination. Minor gaps exist: no delete for files/folders, no cancel for events, and some actions (like revoking a Z.ai key or tearing down a room) are explicitly left to human console use. Overall, the surface is remarkably comprehensive for the stated scope.