Skip to main content
Glama

Delete a checkpoint

delete_checkpoint

Delete a saved checkpoint permanently, freeing its share of this computer's checkpoint storage. The computer itself is untouched. Use this to make room when the limit is reached.

Later checkpoints hold only the changes since the ones before them, so deleting an early one is refused while newer ones are built on it — the refusal names them. Prefer deleting the newest states you are confident you will never go back to. Only pass cascade after telling the owner exactly which of their save points it would take: deleting several of somebody's checkpoints to make room for one of yours is the failure this feature exists to insure against.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cascadeNoAlso delete every later checkpoint built on this one. Ask the owner first.
checkpointYesCheckpoint id, from list_checkpoints

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so well: it discloses permanence, that storage is freed, that the computer is unaffected, that deleting an early checkpoint is refused while newer ones depend on it, and that the refusal names the dependents. It also warns that cascade destroys multiple of someone else's save points. This is unusually rich behavioral disclosure for a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action, storage effect, and the corrective non-effect are front-loaded in the first sentence, with the caveats following. The prose is a little dense in the third sentence, but every clause carries operational weight and none is filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter destructive tool with no annotations and no output schema, the description covers safety, dependency semantics, refusal behavior, and the dangerous cascade case. Nothing material an agent needs to call this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds genuine meaning beyond the schema: it explains that cascade removes 'every later checkpoint built on this one' and requires the owner's consent first, going past the schema's terse 'Ask the owner first.' The dependency relationship between checkpoints is semantic context the schema does not convey.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Delete a saved checkpoint permanently') with the scope clarified ('the computer itself is untouched'). This clearly separates it from siblings like restore_checkpoint and list_checkpoints without needing to open a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly says when to use it ('make room when the limit is reached') and which checkpoint to prefer ('the newest states you are confident you will never go back to'). It also gives a conditional guardrail for cascade and explains the refusal case for early checkpoints, so the agent knows both when to act and when not to.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources