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Post Virtualassistants Login

hgr_post_virtualassistants_login
Destructive

Dedicated HGRApi tool for POST api/VirtualAssistants/Login. This is an explicit tool with a fixed endpoint; it is not a generic endpoint caller. HGRApi functional documentation: Purpose: Signs in using the VA's own credentials; returns choices when several client relationships are active. ownerAgent: account-metrics. Use when: Open the separate VA login. Input: Email, Password, optional exact ProfileId after selection. Output: VA token plus effective permissions, or RequiresSelection and available profiles. Search terms: virtualassistants login. Send the exact request payload in body. Requires confirmed=true before execution.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "body": "<body>",
      "confirmed": "<confirmed>"
    },
    "name": "hgr_post_virtualassistants_login"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyYesHGRApi POST /api/VirtualAssistants/Login request body.
confirmedYesMust be true after the user explicitly requested or confirmed the exact action.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare non-read-only, non-idempotent, open-world and destructive; the description adds real context beyond that: the multi-client branch returning RequiresSelection and available profiles, the returned VA token with effective permissions, and the confirmed=true human-gate requirement. It does not explain session lifetime, whether an existing session is invalidated, or why the operation carries a destructive hint, which is a notable omission for a login that mutates auth state.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The useful information is front-loaded but padded by boilerplate: the endpoint-path restatement, "This is an explicit tool with a fixed endpoint; it is not a generic endpoint caller," the ownerAgent label, and a "Search terms" line that adds no invocation value. Compressing these would make the operative guidance (input, output, confirmation gate) stand out.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, high-stakes auth operation the definition covers input fields, output branches, and the confirmation requirement, and an output schema exists to carry return details. The remaining gap is behavioral: no statement about session side effects or invalidation of prior tokens, which matters given the destructiveHint annotation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is nominally 100%, but the only substantive parameter is an untyped body object described merely as "request body," so the description carries the real burden. It names the payload fields (Email, Password, optional exact ProfileId after selection) and clarifies that ProfileId is only supplied after a selection step, which the schema alone cannot convey.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a concrete verb and resource: "Signs in using the VA's own credentials" against api/VirtualAssistants/Login, and clarifies the shape of the outcome when several client relationships are active. It also explicitly disclaims being a generic endpoint caller, which separates it from the many generic hgr_post_* siblings. An agent can distinguish it from hgr_post_virtualassistants_access and hgr_get_virtualassistants_session without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Use when: Open the separate VA login" plus the stated prerequisite "Requires confirmed=true before execution" gives clear triggering context and a gating condition. What it lacks is an explicit exclusion or pointer to alternatives, e.g. when to use hgr_post_virtualassistants_access or the session tool instead of a fresh login.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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