Skip to main content
Glama

txintent

Read-onlyIdempotent

Tx Intent Classifier: decodes the REAL intent of an on-chain transaction (Base/Ethereum) and returns an Ed25519-signed risk verdict (safe/review/suspicious/dangerous). Catches unlimited approvals, opaque selectors, value-to-contract, reverted tx. POST {"tx_hash":"0x..","chain":"base"} or {"to":"0x..

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
inputNoparametros del producto (JSON o texto)

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint, and non-destructive behavior. The description adds value beyond that by disclosing that the output is Ed25519-signed and by spelling out the malicious transaction patterns it catches. It does not discuss limitations or signature verification steps, but the annotation coverage lowers that burden.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact, front-loaded, and packs in purpose, output format, detection capabilities, and request examples without wasted words. It is slightly hurt by the incomplete final JSON snippet and by mixing raw POST syntax into a tool description that actually expects a single 'input' string.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Core behavior, output categories, and example payloads are covered, and an output schema exists. However, the generic 'input' schema, the ambiguous relationship between the POST JSON and the tool parameter, the missing chain values, and the truncated example leave the agent needing to infer important invocation details. For a transaction-risk classifier, this is a meaningful gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema only provides a generic 'input' string described as 'parametros del producto (JSON o texto)', which is not useful on its own. The description compensates with concrete payload examples: {'tx_hash':'0x..','chain':'base'} or {'to':'0x..'}. It loses a point because it never explicitly explains that this JSON should be passed inside the 'input' string, and the example is truncated.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description specifies a clear verb ('decodes the REAL intent'), a concrete resource ('on-chain transaction'), target chains (Base/Ethereum), and a distinctive output (Ed25519-signed risk verdict with safe/review/suspicious/dangerous categories). It also lists specific detection cases like unlimited approvals and opaque selectors, which distinguishes it from siblings such as tx_simulator and asset_risk.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides clear contextual usage signals: use it when you need to decode a transaction's true intent or detect risky patterns like unlimited approvals, opaque selectors, value-to-contract, and reverted transactions. It does not explicitly name alternatives or say when not to use it, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Disambiguation2/5

The Polymarket/resolution cluster alone has eight tools (dispute_risk, market_resolution, resolution_source_feed, resolution_verdict, polymarket_resolution_watch, polymarket_odds_movers, polymarket_whales, insider_radar) with heavily overlapping responsibilities, and several risk-verdict tools also blur together. Descriptions clarify somewhat, but an agent would frequently need to read full details to avoid selecting the wrong tool.

Naming Consistency4/5

Nearly all tools use lowercase snake_case noun-phrase names like asset_risk and sanctions_screen. A few one-word compounds (codeaudit, macrobundle, txintent) and varying prefixes break the pattern slightly, but the overall style is consistent and readable.

Tool Count2/5

30 tools exceeds the 25-tool threshold and feels heavy even for a multi-domain data marketplace. Many tools are individually sold data products, and several could be consolidated — particularly the resolution/verdict/source-feed group.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the stated domains well: maritime/chokepoint risk, Polymarket resolution and trading signals, DeFi/macro data, and transaction/identity security. Minor gaps include no registry-list/query companion to registry_watch and no historical time-series endpoint for risk verdicts, but core workflows are not dead-ended.

Resources