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Helvabase — Governed response dossiers

helvabase_prepare_dossier_access

DestructiveIdempotent

Prepare the exact complete before/after dossier access list. No permissions change. Requires current lead/delegated co-lead, or verified workspace owner/admin for legacy migration; cannot self-escalate or remove the final lead. Editors receive exact field scopeIds; reviewers require exact reviewScopeIds. This feature is disabled until operator acceptance.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
grantsYes
projectIdYesHelvabase project/mapping ID returned by list or create dossier, never a local path.
idempotencyKeyYesUnique key for this logical mutation. Reuse exactly the same key and arguments after a timeout; never generate a new key to force a replay.
expectedRevisionYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already signal non-read-only, idempotent, and destructive behavior; the description adds valuable context beyond those flags: no actual permissions change, role-based authorization requirements, the final-lead invariant, role-specific scope field requirements, and the disabled-until-acceptance state. There is no contradiction with the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Five short sentences, all high-signal, with the core purpose front-loaded. There is no filler, no restatement of schema structure, and each sentence earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a complex staged-access tool with no output schema, this covers the essential purpose, authorization preconditions, invariants, role-field semantics, and feature availability. The main omissions are the meaning of expectedRevision and what action should follow after preparation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already documents projectId and idempotencyKey well. The description adds the important semantic that editors use scopeIds and reviewers require reviewScopeIds, and it implies grants should be a complete before/after list. It does not explain expectedRevision beyond the schema pattern, which is the main gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description uses a specific verb ('Prepare') and a specific object ('the exact complete before/after dossier access list'), and it disambiguates from sibling apply/confirm/request tools by stating 'No permissions change.' An agent can tell this is a staging/computation tool rather than a mutating access-control tool.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear invocation constraints: requires current lead/delegated co-lead, or verified owner/admin for legacy migration, and notes the feature is disabled until operator acceptance. It also states invariants like no self-escalation and no removal of the final lead. It does not explicitly name sibling alternatives or provide when-not-to-use guidance, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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