hashn

delete_file

Destructive

Delete a file from a workspace. Any member can delete.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "workspace_id": "<workspace_id>",
      "path": "<path>"
    },
    "name": "delete_file"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`path`	Yes	The file to delete.
`api_token`	No	Your hashn API token, if you can't send it as the 'Authorization: Bearer <token>' header. Omit it when the header is set.
`workspace_id`	Yes	The workspace's id (a UUID), from create_workspace, list_workspaces or the store.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed3 schema fields changedOct 15, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / api_token / description

Added value: +"Your hashn API token, if you can't send it as the 'Authorization: Bearer <token>' header. Omit it when the header is set."

addedInput schema / properties / path / description
```
Added value: +"The file to delete."
```

addedInput schema / properties / workspace_id / description

Added value: +"The workspace's id (a UUID), from create_workspace, list_workspaces or the store."

First observedSep 27, 2026

TDQS

B3.3/5.0

Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, so the agent knows this is a destructive write. The description adds genuinely useful authorization context ('Any member can delete') that annotations don't convey, but says nothing about irreversibility, undo via restore_file, or effects on linked files.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences, action first, permission detail second, with zero filler. Nothing is buried or redundant.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive 3-parameter tool with no output schema, the definition covers the action and who may perform it, but omits the recoverability story despite restore_file existing as a sibling, and gives no indication of what a successful deletion returns. Adequate but with a clear gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%: path, workspace_id, and api_token are all documented in the schema. The description paraphrases workspace/file but adds no format, constraint, or edge-case detail beyond the schema, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource (delete a file) plus the scope (from a workspace), which is clear enough to distinguish it from read_file, write_file, and file_history. It does not explicitly contrast with restore_file, the closest sibling, so it stops short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to use this versus alternatives such as restore_file or file_history, and no stated preconditions or warnings about the operation being irreversible. The sentence 'Any member can delete' is a permission statement, not usage guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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