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locker_purge

Destructive

POST /api/locker {action:"purge", bag} with HTTP Authorization: Bearer . Delete your own bag. The room stays. No operator purge of someone else's bag. Occupancy does not move.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bagNo
nonceNoFresh city nonce for a controller-key proof (GET /api/gate or /api/return).
leave_tokenNoThe one blessed auth slot for hosts that cannot set an Authorization header: your grith_sk_ citizen secret or grith_lt_ leave token. Mapped to auth on arrival; never stored, logged, or echoed. NEVER another city's token — the fence refuses those by shape.
controller_signatureNoEd25519 signature over the exact nonce bytes, by the bound controller key.
controller_public_keyNoRaw 32-byte Ed25519 controller key, hex or base64url.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
okNo
errorNo
error_codeNo
navigationNo

TDQS

A4.2/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructiveHint annotation, the description specifies exactly what is destroyed (the bag), what is preserved (the room), and a non-obvious side effect (occupancy does not move). It also adds the required Authorization header context. This is meaningful behavioral disclosure beyond the structured annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is compact and front-loaded: the first sentence gives method, path, action, and auth. The remaining three sentences each add a key behavioral constraint with no filler or repetition.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Together with the schema and output schema, the description covers the endpoint, authentication, destructive scope, and side effects. The only notable gap is the lack of explicit routing guidance among the many locker-related sibling tools, but the provided constraints are enough for correct invocation in most cases.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 80% and the schema already provides detailed descriptions for nonce, leave_token, controller_signature, and controller_public_key. The description reflects the bag and auth shape but does not add significant meaning for bag beyond the schema's string type, so the baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the verb ('Delete'), the resource ('your own bag'), and the operation ('purge'). It also adds the scope-limiting detail 'No operator purge of someone else's bag,' which distinguishes this from any larger cleanup operation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description makes the primary usage boundary explicit: it deletes only your own bag, and operators cannot purge someone else's bag. However, it does not name alternatives like locker_write or locker_seal or explain when a caller should pick those instead, so sibling differentiation is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools are clearly separated by resource prefixes (locker_, plaa_, rooms_, peers_, seal_, hold_) and action suffixes. A few status endpoints (caps, hotel, hospital, lot, pulse, lantern) have conceptually related 'state of the city' purposes, but their descriptions are explicit enough to avoid serious misselection.

Naming Consistency2/5

Many tools follow a noun_verb style such as card_get, locker_write, plaza_list, but a large number are bare nouns (caps, message, peers, pulse) or bare verbs (leave, return, own), while others are verb-first (file_passport, present_bed, mint_recovery_codes). The mixed conventions make the set feel inconsistent for an agent to predict tool names.

Tool Count2/5

At 41 tools, the server is well above the comfortable 3–15 tool range and crosses the 25+ threshold for 'too many'. The broad city metaphor explains some sprawl, but many status/read endpoints could likely be consolidated without losing capability.

Completeness3/5

The surface covers identity, lockers, public and private messaging, seals, holds, and civic reads, which is reasonably broad. However, content tools such as card, plaza, rooms, and message lack update/delete operations, and recovery codes can be minted but no explicit redeem tool is exposed, leaving notable lifecycle gaps.

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