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merjax_security_ioc_hits

Read-only

Site admins only (needs an 'admin'-scoped token). Campaign indicator-of-compromise hits: pushes, token uses and repositories that matched a reviewed signature in src/lib/security/campaign-iocs.json (e.g. the Gheist campaign: ci-sync-XXXXXX branches, sync-check.yml, user agent 'gheist'). Filter by signature_id, repository ('owner/name'), since (ISO date); limit (default 50, max 200) / offset. Returns {signatureVersion, signatures, totals, sweep, hits[{id, signatureId, campaign, severity, detectedBy, repository, ref, sha, tokenKind, tokenId, userAgent, evidence, createdAt}]}. Read-only; nothing is revoked.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoMax rows (default 50, max 200)
sinceNoOnly hits at or after this ISO date/time
offsetNoRows to skip
repositoryNoOnly hits on this repository, as owner/name
signature_idNoOnly hits of this signature (e.g. gheist-2026-10)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and destructiveHint=false, so 'Read-only; nothing is revoked' is largely redundant. Beyond that, the description adds real value: the required admin token scope, the source-of-truth config file, and the pagination defaults (limit 50, max 200).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the access requirement and the resource definition before the filters and return shape, and every clause carries information. The single dense paragraph mixing filters and the full return-object listing is slightly cramped, but no sentence is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description compensates by spelling out the return object (signatureVersion, signatures, totals, sweep, hits with their fields). Auth requirements, filters, defaults, and safety profile are all covered, so an agent can call this correctly without further context.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so every parameter is already documented in structured form, establishing a baseline of 3. The description does add some flavor by giving an example signature id (gheist-2026-10) and restating the limit defaults, but it introduces no format or semantics beyond what the schema provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific resource — campaign indicator-of-compromise hits (pushes, token uses, repositories matching a reviewed signature in campaign-iocs.json) — and grounds it with concrete examples like ci-sync-XXXXXX branches and the 'gheist' user agent. The verb is implicit (a listing/retrieval) and no sibling such as merjax_security_scan is named, so an agent must infer it is the IoC-hit listing rather than a general scan.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a clear access precondition ('Site admins only, needs an admin-scoped token') and enumerates the filter dimensions, which implies when the tool is applicable. It never says when not to use it or points to the sibling merjax_security_scan for broader scanning, so routing between security tools is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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