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merjax_revoke_all_credentials

Destructive

Site admins only (needs an 'admin'-scoped token). Revoke every browser session, personal access token (repository tokens included) and OAuth grant — for every user (scope 'platform') or for one (scope 'user' + username). Optionally force a password reset (old password stops working, reset email sent) and 2FA re-enrolment (seeds and recovery codes deleted). Confirm by sending confirm exactly: 'REVOKE ALL CREDENTIALS' for platform, 'REVOKE ' for one user; anything else changes nothing. Platform scope revokes YOUR OWN sessions and tokens too, including the token making this call. Audit-logged. Not covered: SSH keys, passkeys, deploy keys/tokens, CI runners, app installation tokens. Returns counts, actorSignedOut and notCovered.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scopeYes'platform' (every user) or 'user' (one account)
confirmYesExactly 'REVOKE ALL CREDENTIALS' (platform) or 'REVOKE <username>' (user)
usernameNoRequired when scope is 'user'
force_2fa_reenrolNoDelete TOTP seeds and recovery codes so the user enrols again
force_password_resetNoReplace the password so the old one stops working, and send the reset email

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only say destructiveHint=true; the description goes far beyond by disclosing the exact confirmation phrase required, that platform scope revokes the caller's own token mid-call, the password-reset email side effect, 2FA seed and recovery-code deletion, and that the action is audit-logged. It even enumerates what is NOT destroyed, which is critical for an agent judging blast radius.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One dense but front-loaded block: permission gate first, then what is destroyed, then scope options, then side effects, then confirmation protocol. Every sentence carries operational weight, and even the trailing 'Returns counts, actorSignedOut and notCovered' compensates for the absent output schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an irreversibly destructive admin tool with no output schema, the description covers the permission gate, destructive scope, self-revocation hazard, confirmation protocol, optional side effects, exclusions, and return fields. An agent has everything needed to decide and to invoke it safely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds the cross-parameter coupling the schema only states pairwise: the confirm string must be 'REVOKE ALL CREDENTIALS' for platform versus 'REVOKE <username>' for user, tying confirm and username to scope in one place. The consequences of force_password_reset and force_2fa_reenrol are restated rather than newly explained, keeping it below a 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource plus its full blast radius: 'Revoke every browser session, personal access token (repository tokens included) and OAuth grant'. The explicit 'every user (scope platform) or one (scope user + username)' plus the 'Not covered' list makes it clearly distinct from narrower siblings like merjax_revoke_token or merjax_revoke_repo_token.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives the key precondition ('Site admins only, needs an admin-scoped token') and states which scope to choose for which situation. It also lists exclusions (SSH keys, passkeys, deploy keys, CI runners, app installation tokens), which implicitly routes those cases elsewhere. It stops short of naming the specific alternative tools for single-token or repo-token revocation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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