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merjax_list_loop_secrets

Read-onlyIdempotent

List the secrets a hosted Claude loop (or an organisation) holds — names and dates, never values. Pass loop (the hosted Claude loop's id, from /connect/claude/deploy) for the loop's own secret — its owner only — or org (organisation slug, admin-scoped token) for an organisation-level secret every loop of the organisation inherits; a loop-level name overrides the organisation's. ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is the loop's model key (CAP-S.8: the platform never lends its own); at organisation level it is the BYOK override. Returns {scope, secrets:[{name, scope, createdAt, updatedAt, lastUsedAt}], inherited:[…]} where inherited are the organisation-level names a loop gets unless it overrides them.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
orgNoOrganisation slug
loopNoHosted Claude loop id (uuid)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world), and the description adds real behavioral context on top: values are never returned, ownership and token scopes are required, loop-level names override organisation-level ones, and the CAP-S.8 note explains what ANTHROPIC_API_KEY means in each scope. Strong, though it never mentions caching, pagination, or behavior when neither parameter is supplied.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded and every sentence carries content, but the definition is a single semicolon-chained block that packs the CAP-S.8 aside and the return-shape listing into the same breath, making it dense to parse. It is efficient but not well structured for scanning.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return contract and does so explicitly (scope, secrets array with fields, inherited list), and it also covers permissions, scope selection, and inheritance semantics. An agent has everything needed to call this correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds meaning the schema lacks: where the loop id comes from (/connect/claude/deploy), that it must be one's own loop, that org requires an admin-scoped token, and the precedence relationship between the two. This goes beyond the terse schema descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening clause states a specific verb and resource ('List the secrets a hosted Claude loop (or an organisation) holds') and immediately narrows scope ('names and dates, never values'), which separates it from value-returning or repo-scoped secret tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It explicitly says which parameter to pass for which scope and names the prerequisites for each ('its owner only' for loop, 'admin-scoped token' for org), plus the override rule. It stops short of naming sibling alternatives such as set_loop_secret or list_repo_secrets, so the routing guidance is clear but not exhaustive.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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