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merjax_delete_loop_secret

DestructiveIdempotent

Delete a hosted-loop (or organisation-level) secret by name. Pass loop (the hosted Claude loop's id, from /connect/claude/deploy) for the loop's own secret — its owner only — or org (organisation slug, admin-scoped token) for an organisation-level secret every loop of the organisation inherits; a loop-level name overrides the organisation's. ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is the loop's model key (CAP-S.8: the platform never lends its own); at organisation level it is the BYOK override. A secret that does not exist is a not-found error, never reported as deleted. Audit-logged. Returns {name, deleted: true}.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
orgNoOrganisation slug
loopNoHosted Claude loop id (uuid)
nameYesSecret name, an environment variable name: letters, digits and _, starting with a letter (stored upper-case). PATH, HOME, INPUT and GLUECRON_* are the runtime's own and refused.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructive=true and idempotent=true, but the description adds real value beyond them: a missing secret is a not-found error and never reported as deleted (clarifying why idempotency does not mean silent success), the call is audit-logged, ownership/authorization requirements differ per scope, and the exact return value {name, deleted: true} is stated.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the action and resource, then layered scope, auth and return details. It is one dense semicolon-chained sentence whose clauses all carry information, though a reader must parse carefully to separate the loop path from the org path.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive 3-parameter mutation with no output schema, everything an agent needs is present: scope selection and required privilege, name constraints (enforced in schema), the not-found failure mode, audit logging, and the return shape. Nothing material is left to inference.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the 3 baseline is met by the schema alone; the description nonetheless adds meaning the schema does not carry — what 'loop' is (a hosted Claude loop id from /connect/claude/deploy), what 'org' implies about token scope and inheritance, and the special status of ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (CAP-S.8, platform never lends its own key; BYOK override at org level).

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a specific verb+resource ('Delete a hosted-loop (or organisation-level) secret by name') and immediately distinguishes the two scopes plus the name-override relationship, which separates it from sibling deletion tools like merjax_delete_repo_secret or merjax_delete_variable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete selection criteria: pass 'loop' for the loop's own secret (owner only) or 'org' for an organisation-wide secret requiring an admin-scoped token, and notes a loop-level name overrides the org's. It even points to where the loop id comes from (/connect/claude/deploy). It stops short of naming sibling tools such as merjax_list_loop_secrets for discovery, so not a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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