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gluecron_security_ioc_hits

Read-only

Site admins only (needs an 'admin'-scoped token). Campaign indicator-of-compromise hits: pushes, token uses and repositories that matched a reviewed signature in src/lib/security/campaign-iocs.json (e.g. the Gheist campaign: ci-sync-XXXXXX branches, sync-check.yml, user agent 'gheist'). Filter by signature_id, repository ('owner/name'), since (ISO date); limit (default 50, max 200) / offset. Returns {signatureVersion, signatures, totals, sweep, hits[{id, signatureId, campaign, severity, detectedBy, repository, ref, sha, tokenKind, tokenId, userAgent, evidence, createdAt}]}. Read-only; nothing is revoked.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoMax rows (default 50, max 200)
sinceNoOnly hits at or after this ISO date/time
offsetNoRows to skip
repositoryNoOnly hits on this repository, as owner/name
signature_idNoOnly hits of this signature (e.g. gheist-2026-10)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and destructiveHint=false, yet the description adds real value: the admin-token requirement, the on-disk signature source, and the reassurance that nothing is revoked as a consequence of querying. It stops short of describing pagination cost or scan freshness/sweep staleness beyond naming the 'sweep' field.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the access gate and purpose, then filters, then return shape — a sensible order with no filler sentences. It is dense to the point of being run-on, packing auth, source file, filters, and the full return field list into one block.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description compensates by enumerating the returned object structure (signatureVersion, signatures, totals, sweep, hits[...] with all fields), plus the auth precondition and filter semantics. An agent can call this correctly and interpret the response without further lookup.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and each parameter already carries a description, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description restates the same filter set (signature_id, repository, since, limit default 50/max 200, offset) without adding syntax or format detail beyond the schema — the baseline 3.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific resource — campaign indicator-of-compromise hits — and enumerates the concrete match surfaces (pushes, token uses, repositories) plus the source file and example campaign. It never explicitly contrasts with the sibling gluecron_security_scan, so an agent must infer the boundary between 'list recorded hits' and 'run a scan'.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states a hard prerequisite ('Site admins only, needs an admin-scoped token') and lists the available filter dimensions, which implies when the tool is useful. But there is no explicit when-to-use/when-not guidance and no named alternative (e.g. security_scan for a fresh sweep vs this for existing hit records).

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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