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gluecron_rotate_token

Destructive

Rotate one of your tokens: mint a new secret with the same name, scopes / permissions, repository and expiry, returned ONCE as token. grace_seconds (default 0, max 604800 = 7 days) keeps the old secret working that long; 0 kills it now. Rotating again ends an earlier grace period. expected_rotation_count (from gluecron_get_token's rotationCount) makes it compare-and-swap; two concurrent rotations never both win. type is pat (personal access token, glc_), repo (repository token, gcft_) or deploy (deploy token, gcdt_). PATs need 'admin' scope; repository and deploy tokens need 'repo'. Audit-logged.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesToken id
typeYesToken type: pat (personal access token, glc_), repo (repository token, gcft_) or deploy (deploy token, gcdt_)
grace_secondsNoSeconds the old secret keeps working (0 to 604800). Default 0.
expected_rotation_countNoOptional compare-and-swap guard: the rotationCount you last saw.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the destructiveHint/readOnlyHint annotations: the new secret is returned ONCE, grace_seconds controls whether the old secret survives and for how long, a second rotation cancels an earlier grace period, expected_rotation_count gives compare-and-swap semantics, and the action is audit-logged. This is exactly the mutation-risk detail an agent needs.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and the ONCE return, then terse parameter notes. It is dense but each clause carries distinct operational meaning; minor overlap with the schema's own parameter descriptions keeps it from being maximally tight.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so ('returned ONCE as `token`'). Combined with grace-period, concurrency, scope, and audit details, an agent has everything needed to call it correctly and safely.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds value beyond the schema by explaining the concurrency behavior of expected_rotation_count, the default/max and old-secret effect of grace_seconds, and the scope requirements (admin for pat, repo otherwise) that the schema does not state.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (rotate) and resource (token) and immediately clarifies the mechanics: a new secret with the same name/scopes/repo/expiry. An agent can distinguish this from siblings like revoke_token, create_repo_token, and get_token without opening schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context, including that expected_rotation_count comes from gluecron_get_token's rotationCount, and the scope prerequisites per token type. It stops short of explicitly naming revoke_token or create_*_token as the when-not alternatives, so routing among the token-management siblings is implied rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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