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Fairquery Agent Trust & Data Safety

Pre-check an MCP server (free scan on this Worker)

mcp_server_precheck
Read-onlyIdempotent

WHAT: Pre-install check for one MCP server. Scans tool names (split on _ - . and camelCase), descriptions, parameter names/descriptions and schema enum/default/examples you pass for injection phrasing, concealed characters (tag characters, base64 and hex blobs are decoded and rescanned), hidden markup, cross-server references, shadowing of other tools in the same list (same sentence; plain ordering like "call X first" is not flagged), and exfil destinations (email/URL/public IP/paste site next to send/post/upload/copy/forward/BCC, or stealth wording + action + user data). Optional baseline compares SHA-256 fingerprints with a prior scan (rug pull). Optional sarif=true adds a SARIF 2.1.0 log. An MCPB manifest in toolsListJson also has its server.mcp_config command checked for download-and-pipe-to-shell, and its server.mcp_config / mcpServers env, headers, args and url checked for hardcoded secrets (same detectors as mcpConfig, masked). Also flags shell/exec tools and unrestricted file paths (OVERBROAD_PERMISSION), near-miss tool or package names (TYPOSQUAT), and with servers[] the private-data + untrusted-input + external-send combination across servers (TOXIC_FLOW). Injection and exfil phrasing is also matched in Spanish, French, German, Portuguese, Italian and Dutch. The same rules also run on prompts, resources and SKILL.md text you pass (skillMd shell blocks are checked for download-and-pipe-to-shell), and serverUrl fetches a remote server's tools/list for you. mcpConfig (a pasted mcp.json / claude_desktop_config.json / env block) is checked for hardcoded secrets and personal data with the pii_scan_text detectors (credential hygiene; values are masked, nothing is forwarded). Every result has meta.grade, an A-F letter for non-technical readers, labelled meta.grade_label "Static checks: A": it reflects deterministic pattern checks only; semantic analysis is not run. Limitation: this free tier does not detect instructions reworded to avoid known phrasing (paraphrased injection or exfiltration), so a clean grade is not proof of safety. Every finding has source (remote: for what serverUrl fetched, pasted: for text you passed); meta.grades_by_source grades each source separately, the overall meta.grade is the worst across sources (all findings of the call together), and with serverUrl meta.remote.grade is the remote server's own grade. serverUrl is scanned alone: mixing it with pasted tools/toolsListJson/servers/prompts/resources/skillMd/mcpConfig returns INPUT_MIXED_SOURCES. WHEN: Before installing or enabling an MCP server, once you have a tools/list result to pass as tools or toolsListJson (or its https URL as serverUrl), or to check an MCP client config for hardcoded keys (mcpConfig). WHEN NOT: For a dependency audit with no tool list, call osv_audit_dependencies. For a few exact versions, call osv_query_packages. This tool does not install, start or execute the package. COST: The scan is free and runs on this Fairquery-hosted Worker (Cloudflare), not on the caller's machine; tool names and descriptions you send leave the client. serverUrl is opt-in and free: this Worker connects to that URL itself (with serverBearerToken as an Authorization header if given; the token is not stored, logged or echoed), so the remote server sees a request from Cloudflare, not from you (meta.shared_externally.server_url_contacted). This Worker's code is designed not to store them and does not forward them to Apify. path and packageName are refused (PATH_NOT_ALLOWED) because this Worker has no disk. auditDependencies=true is opt-in: if toolsListJson carries a package name (MCPB manifest or package.json "name", not private), that name is sent to registry.npmjs.org (public GET, free, meta.shared_externally.package_name_to_npm_registry true); if toolsListJson is a package.json (or package-lock.json) document, its text is sent to the paid OSV Actor with your Apify token ($0.50 per 1,000 packages + $1.50 per 1,000 vulnerabilities found); without a token the audit row is APIFY_TOKEN_MISSING. A manifest is never read from disk. baseline and sarif are computed on this Worker (WebCrypto SHA-256); nothing is stored or sent anywhere. mcpConfig is scanned on this Worker only (no network call); secrets found are masked in evidence and never echoed. Free serverUrl is a one-off fetch of one public endpoint, soft rate-limited per Worker instance (10/min per host, 60/min overall; in-memory, not a durable or global quota). Bulk, scheduled and monitored fetching are not part of the free tier. RETURNS: Paged "finding" rows (rule, severity, tool, field, evidence). Evidence escapes hidden characters JS-style (\n, \u200B, \u{E0069}). Duplicate tool names are never dropped: every definition is scanned, meta.tools_scanned equals the number of tools received (meta.tools_input), and each duplicated name gets a high DUPLICATE_TOOL_NAME finding (shadowing risk). Other rules: PROMPT_INJECTION, HIDDEN_INSTRUCTION, SECRET_EXFILTRATION, CONCEALED_TEXT, ENCODED_INSTRUCTION (critical: a base64/hex blob decodes to an instruction), TOOL_SHADOWING (a description names another tool in the list with must/always/BCC/instead/before; high for hijack words or a destination), CROSS_SERVER_REFERENCE, MIXED_SCRIPT, SUSPICIOUS_PARAMETER, INSTALL_PIPE_TO_SHELL (field install_command; critical for curl|bash style, high for sh -c; field skill_md: critical for curl|bash in SKILL.md), EXFIL_DESTINATION (send/post/upload/copy/forward/BCC to a paste site, a fixed email/URL with user data/copy/stealth wording, or a raw public IP), COVERT_EXFILTRATION (stealth / hidden-from-the-user wording + an action on user data), OVERBROAD_PERMISSION (high: shell/exec-named tool with a free-form command/script parameter; medium: exec-style name alone or any/absolute-path file access; low: write/delete tool with an unrestricted path; sandbox wording lowers it), TYPOSQUAT (a tool name 1-2 typo edits from another tool in the list or a well-known MCP tool; high for look-alike characters or a near-miss popular npm package name, field package_name), TOXIC_FLOW (servers[] only: private-data reader + untrusted-content source + external sender; high when they span servers, field servers; message and evidence name the reader, untrusted and sender tools, first 8 of each), and with baseline: TOOL_CHANGED (high; list-hash-only baseline: medium, field tool_list), TOOL_ADDED (medium), TOOL_REMOVED (low), field definition. Every finding has owasp tags (OWASP MCP Top 10 2025 MCPxx and LLM Top 10 2025 LLMxx) and source: remote: (serverUrl surface), pasted:tools, pasted:toolsListJson (incl. package, install_command and mcpServers env findings), pasted:servers, pasted:prompts, pasted:resources, pasted:skill_md, pasted:mcp_config or pasted:baseline (TOOL_CHANGED/ADDED/REMOVED); a finding that involves several inputs (duplicate name, typosquat pair, toxic flow) joins them with "+". meta.grades_by_source maps each source to {grade, grade_label, risk_level, finding_counts}; meta.grade / grade_label / risk_level are the worst across sources (computed over all findings together), and meta.grade_scope says so. With serverUrl, meta.remote.grade / grade_label / risk_level / finding_counts come from remote findings only. mcpServers / server.mcp_config inside toolsListJson: env, headers, args and url get the mcpConfig secret detectors (HARDCODED_SECRET / CONFIG_PII, masked; meta.install_config_scanned); anything that cannot be scanned is named in meta.notes as MCP_SERVERS_NOT_SCANNED, never skipped without a note. Prompt/resource/SKILL.md text that sends to a fixed email/URL is EXFIL_DESTINATION medium even without user-data wording. meta.tools_fingerprint (sha256 per tool + list_sha256) is always returned so you can pass it as baseline next time; meta.baseline reports matched/changed/added/removed; meta.sarif is present only when sarif=true. Schema values report field parameter_enum, parameter_default, parameter_examples, parameter_const, parameter_title or schema_default/schema_examples. If auditDependencies is true, one "dependency_audit" row: status no_manifest unless toolsListJson is a package.json/lockfile. meta.risk_level is none, low, medium, high, critical or not_assessed. meta.grade is A-F (A: nothing above low; B: worst medium; C: 1-2 high; D: 3+ high; F: any critical; null when not assessed), meta.grade_scale repeats this. meta.grade_label shows it as "Static checks: ", meta.grade_basis is "static_checks" and meta.semantic_analysis is "not_run"; when a grade is present meta.notes includes PARAPHRASE_GAP (reworded instructions are not detected). mcpConfig findings: HARDCODED_SECRET (high for a known token format such as ghp_/sk-/AKIA/xox, medium for a generic key=value or a secret-named variable holding a literal; tool = server name from the config, field mcp_config_env, mcp_config_header, mcp_config_args, mcp_config_url, mcp_config_auth or mcp_config, parameter = key name, evidence masked) and CONFIG_PII (low: email, phone, card, IBAN, SSN in the config); meta.config_scanned {format, servers, values_scanned, hardcoded_secrets, pii_values, forwarded:false}. TYPOSQUAT severity: look-alike characters or swapped letters high, other single-letter edits low, 2 edits medium; abbreviation pairs (mail/email, msg/message, repo/repository, dir/directory) are not typos. Cross-server TOOL_SHADOWING names the other server and is one level higher than same-list (high -> critical). Prompt/resource/SKILL.md findings use tool = prompt/resource name or "SKILL.md" and field prompt_name, prompt_title, prompt_description, prompt_argument, resource_name, resource_title, resource_description, resource_text or skill_md; meta.extras_scanned counts them. With serverUrl, meta.remote reports host, server_name, protocol_version, tools/prompts/resources fetched and requests. meta.description_scanned is about the package-level description only (false = none present; tool descriptions are always scanned); meta.description_scanned_meaning repeats this. meta.shared_externally is the data-flow record for this call: tool_names_and_descriptions is always false (that text is not forwarded to npm or Apify, though this Worker receives it); package_name_to_npm_registry is true when the package name was sent to registry.npmjs.org; manifest_to_osv_actor is true when manifest text was sent to the OSV Actor; server_url_contacted is the host this Worker connected to for serverUrl (false otherwise). Errors: INPUT_EMPTY, INPUT_MIXED_SOURCES (serverUrl plus pasted content), INVALID_SERVER_URL, SERVER_URL_NOT_ALLOWED, SERVER_URL_RATE_LIMITED, SERVER_URL_AUTH, SERVER_URL_FETCH_FAILED, INVALID_JSON, INVALID_PACKAGE_NAME, PATH_NOT_ALLOWED, INPUT_TOO_LARGE, INVALID_BASELINE. BEHAVIOR: Default auditDependencies=false: no further network call and no process spawn. Scans only tools or toolsListJson you pass. path and packageName return PATH_NOT_ALLOWED and nothing is read. This Worker has no disk, so it does not read package.json, lockfiles, manifest.json, or server.json, and it does not follow symlinks. auditDependencies=true: if toolsListJson carries a package name (MCPB manifest "name" or package.json "name", not private), this Worker sends that name only to registry.npmjs.org (public GET) for license and publish dates; if toolsListJson is a package.json or package-lock.json, this Worker sends that manifest text to the paid OSV Actor (Apify) using your token. Plain tools/list input with no package name makes no registry or OSV call. serverUrl: this Worker POSTs initialize, notifications/initialized and tools/list (plus prompts/list and resources/list metadata when the server advertises them; resources are not read) to that URL over MCP Streamable HTTP, JSON or SSE responses; https and public hostnames only (no IP literals, no internal or trailing-dot internal names, no cloud metadata names, no wildcard-DNS helpers such as nip.io/sslip.io; the host is resolved over DNS-over-HTTPS first and refused if any address is loopback, RFC1918, link-local/metadata 169.254.x, CGNAT, ULA or otherwise reserved; ports 80/443), soft rate limit per Worker instance (SERVER_URL_RATE_LIMITED), redirects not followed, 10 s per request, 12 requests max, then a best-effort DELETE of the session. It never calls a remote tool. meta.shared_externally.package_name_to_npm_registry and manifest_to_osv_actor report exactly which happened. PARAMETERS: Pass tools or toolsListJson (neither, and no path or packageName -> INPUT_EMPTY). tools: structured tools/list entries. toolsListJson: raw JSON of a tools/list result, an MCPB manifest or a tools array; invalid JSON -> INVALID_JSON. path and packageName always fail on this Worker (no disk): an invalid packageName is INVALID_PACKAGE_NAME, and any other path or packageName is PATH_NOT_ALLOWED. Nothing is read or downloaded. Use the npm server @fairquery/agent-trust-mcp for a path or packageName scan. Each field is scanned up to 20,000 characters and the raw total must be <= 500,000. auditDependencies defaults to false; true can make the registry.npmjs.org and paid OSV calls described in BEHAVIOR. minSeverity and includeDevDependencies are only forwarded to the OSV Actor. baseline: optional, a string OR a JSON object/array (JSON-parsing clients may pass the object as-is): the prior meta.tools_fingerprint object or its JSON text (per-tool detail), the 64-hex list_sha256 string or {"list_sha256":"..."} (list-level only), or a prior tools/list result / tools array (invalid -> INVALID_BASELINE). baselineTools: optional array alias (fingerprint tools [{name,sha256}] or a tools array). sarif: boolean, default false; sarif:true puts a SARIF 2.1.0 log in meta.sarif (format:"sarif" is accepted as an alias with a note). servers: optional [{name, tools}] (one entry per installed MCP server, up to 20; total tools still <= 400): every tool is scanned as usual with shadowing/duplicates checked across servers, each finding carries server, a name defined by several servers is DUPLICATE_TOOL_NAME medium, and TOXIC_FLOW is checked. prompts: optional prompts/list entries [{name, description, arguments:[{name, description}]}]. resources: optional resources/list entries [{uri, name, description}] plus optional text (resource content). skillMd: optional SKILL.md text (frontmatter + body, <= 500,000 chars). serverUrl: optional https URL of a remote MCP Streamable HTTP endpoint (e.g. https://example.com/mcp); scan it alone: serverUrl together with tools, toolsListJson, servers, prompts, resources, skillMd or mcpConfig returns INPUT_MIXED_SOURCES and nothing is sent (baseline and sarif are allowed). serverBearerToken: optional bearer token sent only to serverUrl. mcpConfig: optional text (<= 200,000 chars) of an MCP client config: JSON/JSONC with mcpServers, servers, context_servers or mcp.servers, a single server entry, or plain KEY=value / export KEY=value lines; env, headers, args, url and auth fields are scanned for hardcoded secrets (${env:X}, ${input:x}, $X and similar references are skipped). Any other parameter name is ignored and listed in meta.notes as "unknown parameter: ". limit/offset page the combined rows. EXAMPLE: {"tools":[{"name":"sum","description":"Add two numbers."}]} -> risk_level "none", shared_externally.tool_names_and_descriptions false. A poisoned description returns finding rows and a higher risk_level.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "mcp_server_precheck"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
pathNoRefused on this hosted Worker: any path returns PATH_NOT_ALLOWED (no disk). Pass tools or toolsListJson. Example: "/tmp/some-mcp"
limitNoOptional page size: items to return, integer 1-1000 (default 100). Example: 50
sarifNoOptional boolean, default false. true adds meta.sarif, a SARIF 2.1.0 log of the findings with OWASP tags. Example: false
toolsNoOptional if toolsListJson, path or packageName is given. 0-400 tools, as returned by tools/list. Example: [{"name":"sum","description":"Add two numbers."}]
offsetNoOptional zero-based number of items to skip, integer 0-1000000 (default 0); pass nextOffset from the previous response, e.g. 100
promptsNoOptional (t1923u). prompts/list prompts; names, descriptions and argument names/descriptions get the same rules as tools. Example: [{"name":"summarize","description":"Summarize text","arguments":[{"name":"text"}]}]
serversNoOptional multi-server input (t1919u): [{name, tools}] for every server one client will load together. Enables cross-server shadowing, duplicate and TOXIC_FLOW checks. Can be combined with tools. Example: [{"name":"files","tools":[{"name":"read_file"}]},{"name":"web","tools":[{"name":"fetch"}]}]
skillMdNoOptional (t1923u). Full SKILL.md text (Agent Skills). Scanned with the same rules; shell code blocks and `inline` commands are checked for download-and-pipe-to-shell. Example: "---\nname: x\n---\nRun `npm test`."
baselineNoOptional. A string or a JSON object/array: the prior meta.tools_fingerprint object (or its JSON text), its 64-hex list_sha256 string, {"list_sha256":"..."}, or a prior tools/list result / tools array. Compared on this Worker; adds TOOL_CHANGED / TOOL_ADDED / TOOL_REMOVED findings. Nothing is stored. Example: {"list_sha256":"3f5a...64 hex","tools":[{"name":"sum","sha256":"..."}]}
mcpConfigNoOptional (t1932u). Pasted MCP client config (mcp.json, claude_desktop_config.json, .cursor/mcp.json, VS Code servers, or a KEY=value env block). Checked for hardcoded secrets and personal data on this Worker; evidence is masked and nothing is forwarded. Example: "{\"mcpServers\":{\"github\":{\"env\":{\"GITHUB_TOKEN\":\"${env:GITHUB_TOKEN}\"}}}}"
resourcesNoOptional (t1923u). resources/list entries, optionally with text (the resource content). Example: [{"uri":"file:///README.md","name":"readme","text":"..."}]
serverUrlNoOptional (t1923u). https URL of a remote MCP server (Streamable HTTP). This Worker fetches tools/list (and prompts/resources lists when advertised) and scans them; meta.shared_externally.server_url_contacted reports the host. Never calls a remote tool. To scan this Fairquery endpoint itself, paste its tools/list as tools instead: a serverUrl on getfairquery.com (the own zone of this Worker) is refused with SERVER_URL_NOT_ALLOWED before any request. Scan it alone: combining it with pasted tools/toolsListJson/servers/prompts/resources/skillMd/mcpConfig returns INPUT_MIXED_SOURCES. Example: "https://example.com/mcp"
minSeverityNoOptional, one of "ALL" | "LOW" | "MEDIUM" | "HIGH" | "CRITICAL", default "ALL". Forwarded to the OSV Actor only when auditDependencies is trueALL
packageNameNoRefused on this hosted Worker. An invalid npm name returns INVALID_PACKAGE_NAME; any other packageName returns PATH_NOT_ALLOWED (no disk, and the package is not downloaded). Pass tools or toolsListJson. Example: "some-mcp"
baselineToolsNoOptional alias for baseline: an array, either meta.tools_fingerprint.tools ([{name,sha256}]) or a prior tools/list tools array. Ignored when baseline is also given (meta.notes says so). Example: [{"name":"sum","sha256":"..."}]
toolsListJsonNoOptional if tools, path or packageName is given. Raw JSON (<= 2,000,000 chars) of a tools/list result, {"tools":[...]}, an MCPB manifest, or a tools array. Example: "{\"tools\":[{\"name\":\"sum\",\"description\":\"Add two numbers.\"}]}"
auditDependenciesNoOptional boolean, default false. true sends a package name found in toolsListJson (MCPB manifest or package.json) to registry.npmjs.org, and a pasted package.json/package-lock.json to the paid OSV Actor with your Apify token. Nothing is read from disk. With a plain tools/list, true makes no external call and the audit row is no_manifest. Example: false
serverBearerTokenNoOptional. Bearer token sent only to serverUrl as Authorization; never stored, logged or echoed
includeDevDependenciesNoOptional boolean, default true. Forwarded to the OSV Actor only when auditDependencies is true; false skips devDependencies

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
metaNoTool-specific context (summary counts, cost notes, ...)
countYesNumber of items in this page
itemsYesResult rows for this page
totalYesTotal items before paging
offsetYesOffset of the first item in this page
hasMoreYesTrue if more items exist after this page
nextOffsetYesOffset to pass for the next page, or null

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / serverUrl / description
      Previous value: -"Optional (t1923u). https URL of a remote MCP server (Streamable HTTP). This Worker fetches tools/list (and prompts/resources lists when advertised) and scans them; meta.shared_externally.server_url_contacted reports the host. Never calls a remote tool. Scan it alone: combining it with pasted tools/toolsListJson/servers/prompts/resources/skillMd/mcpConfig returns INPUT_MIXED_SOURCES. Example: \"https://example.com/mcp\""New value: +"Optional (t1923u). https URL of a remote MCP server (Streamable HTTP). This Worker fetches tools/list (and prompts/resources lists when advertised) and scans them; meta.shared_externally.server_url_contacted reports the host. Never calls a remote tool. To scan this Fairquery endpoint itself, paste its tools/list as tools instead: a serverUrl on getfairquery.com (the own zone of this Worker) is refused with SERVER_URL_NOT_ALLOWED before any request. Scan it alone: combining it with pasted tools/toolsListJson/servers/prompts/resources/skillMd/mcpConfig returns INPUT_MIXED_SOURCES. Example: \"https://example.com/mcp\""
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / serverUrl / description
      Previous value: -"Optional (t1923u). https URL of a remote MCP server (Streamable HTTP). This Worker fetches tools/list (and prompts/resources lists when advertised) and scans them; meta.shared_externally.server_url_contacted reports the host. Never calls a remote tool. Example: \"https://example.com/mcp\""New value: +"Optional (t1923u). https URL of a remote MCP server (Streamable HTTP). This Worker fetches tools/list (and prompts/resources lists when advertised) and scans them; meta.shared_externally.server_url_contacted reports the host. Never calls a remote tool. Scan it alone: combining it with pasted tools/toolsListJson/servers/prompts/resources/skillMd/mcpConfig returns INPUT_MIXED_SOURCES. Example: \"https://example.com/mcp\""
  3. Changed7 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / mcpConfig
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional (t1932u). Pasted MCP client config (mcp.json, claude_desktop_config.json, .cursor/mcp.json, VS Code servers, or a KEY=value env block). Checked for hardcoded secrets and personal data on this Worker; evidence is masked and nothing is forwarded. Example: \"{\\\"mcpServers\\\":{\\\"github\\\":{\\\"env\\\":{\\\"GITHUB_TOKEN\\\":\\\"${env:GITHUB_TOKEN}\\\"}}}}\"",
      +  "maxLength": 200000,
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / prompts
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional (t1923u). prompts/list prompts; names, descriptions and argument names/descriptions get the same rules as tools. Example: [{\"name\":\"summarize\",\"description\":\"Summarize text\",\"arguments\":[{\"name\":\"text\"}]}]",
      +  "items": {
      +    "additionalProperties": {},
      +    "properties": {
      +      "arguments": {
      +        "items": {
      +          "additionalProperties": {},
      +          "properties": {
      +            "description": {
      +              "maxLength": 20000,
      +              "type": "string"
      +            },
      +            "name": {
      +              "maxLength": 200,
      +              "type": "string"
      +            }
      +          },
      +          "required": [
      +            "name"
      +          ],
      +          "type": "object"
      +        },
      +        "maxItems": 80,
      +        "type": "array"
      +      },
      +      "description": {
      +        "maxLength": 100000,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "name": {
      +        "maxLength": 200,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "title": {
      +        "maxLength": 300,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      }
      +    },
      +    "required": [
      +      "name"
      +    ],
      +    "type": "object"
      +  },
      +  "maxItems": 200,
      +  "type": "array"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / resources
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional (t1923u). resources/list entries, optionally with text (the resource content). Example: [{\"uri\":\"file:///README.md\",\"name\":\"readme\",\"text\":\"...\"}]",
      +  "items": {
      +    "additionalProperties": {},
      +    "properties": {
      +      "description": {
      +        "maxLength": 100000,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "name": {
      +        "maxLength": 200,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "text": {
      +        "maxLength": 200000,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "title": {
      +        "maxLength": 300,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "uri": {
      +        "maxLength": 2000,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      }
      +    },
      +    "type": "object"
      +  },
      +  "maxItems": 200,
      +  "type": "array"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / serverBearerToken
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional. Bearer token sent only to serverUrl as Authorization; never stored, logged or echoed",
      +  "maxLength": 4000,
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / serverUrl
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional (t1923u). https URL of a remote MCP server (Streamable HTTP). This Worker fetches tools/list (and prompts/resources lists when advertised) and scans them; meta.shared_externally.server_url_contacted reports the host. Never calls a remote tool. Example: \"https://example.com/mcp\"",
      +  "maxLength": 2000,
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / servers
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional multi-server input (t1919u): [{name, tools}] for every server one client will load together. Enables cross-server shadowing, duplicate and TOXIC_FLOW checks. Can be combined with tools. Example: [{\"name\":\"files\",\"tools\":[{\"name\":\"read_file\"}]},{\"name\":\"web\",\"tools\":[{\"name\":\"fetch\"}]}]",
      +  "items": {
      +    "properties": {
      +      "name": {
      +        "description": "Server name, e.g. \"github\"",
      +        "maxLength": 120,
      +        "minLength": 1,
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "tools": {
      +        "description": "That server's tools/list tools",
      +        "items": {
      +          "properties": {
      +            "description": {
      +              "description": "Optional, <= 100,000 chars. Tool description. Only the first 20,000 characters are scanned",
      +              "maxLength": 100000,
      +              "type": "string"
      +            },
      +            "inputSchema": {
      +              "additionalProperties": {},
      +              "description": "Optional JSON Schema object for the tool. Property names (incl. nested), descriptions, and enum/default/examples/const/title strings are scanned; other schema fields are ignored",
      +              "propertyNames": {
      +                "type": "string"
      +              },
      +              "type": "object"
      +            },
      +            "name": {
      +              "description": "Required, 1-200 chars. Tool name from tools/list, e.g. \"sum\"",
      +              "maxLength": 200,
      +              "minLength": 1,
      +              "type": "string"
      +            },
      +            "title": {
      +              "description": "Optional, <= 300 chars. Tool title, when the client has one",
      +              "maxLength": 300,
      +              "type": "string"
      +            }
      +          },
      +          "required": [
      +            "name"
      +          ],
      +          "type": "object"
      +        },
      +        "maxItems": 400,
      +        "type": "array"
      +      }
      +    },
      +    "required": [
      +      "name",
      +      "tools"
      +    ],
      +    "type": "object"
      +  },
      +  "maxItems": 20,
      +  "type": "array"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / skillMd
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional (t1923u). Full SKILL.md text (Agent Skills). Scanned with the same rules; shell code blocks and `inline` commands are checked for download-and-pipe-to-shell. Example: \"---\\nname: x\\n---\\nRun `npm test`.\"",
      +  "maxLength": 500000,
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  4. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / additionalProperties
      Added value: +{}
    • addedInput schema / properties / baseline
      Added value: +{
      +  "anyOf": [
      +    {
      +      "maxLength": 2000000,
      +      "type": "string"
      +    },
      +    {
      +      "additionalProperties": {},
      +      "propertyNames": {
      +        "type": "string"
      +      },
      +      "type": "object"
      +    },
      +    {
      +      "items": {},
      +      "maxItems": 800,
      +      "type": "array"
      +    }
      +  ],
      +  "description": "Optional. A string or a JSON object/array: the prior meta.tools_fingerprint object (or its JSON text), its 64-hex list_sha256 string, {\"list_sha256\":\"...\"}, or a prior tools/list result / tools array. Compared on this Worker; adds TOOL_CHANGED / TOOL_ADDED / TOOL_REMOVED findings. Nothing is stored. Example: {\"list_sha256\":\"3f5a...64 hex\",\"tools\":[{\"name\":\"sum\",\"sha256\":\"...\"}]}"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / baselineTools
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional alias for baseline: an array, either meta.tools_fingerprint.tools ([{name,sha256}]) or a prior tools/list tools array. Ignored when baseline is also given (meta.notes says so). Example: [{\"name\":\"sum\",\"sha256\":\"...\"}]",
      +  "items": {},
      +  "maxItems": 800,
      +  "type": "array"
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / sarif
      Added value: +{
      +  "default": false,
      +  "description": "Optional boolean, default false. true adds meta.sarif, a SARIF 2.1.0 log of the findings with OWASP tags. Example: false",
      +  "type": "boolean"
      +}
  5. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / auditDependencies / description
      Previous value: -"Optional boolean, default false. On this Worker a manifest is not read, so true does not start the OSV Actor; the audit row is no_manifest. Use osv_audit_dependencies for a pasted manifest. Example: false"New value: +"Optional boolean, default false. true sends a package name found in toolsListJson (MCPB manifest or package.json) to registry.npmjs.org, and a pasted package.json/package-lock.json to the paid OSV Actor with your Apify token. Nothing is read from disk. With a plain tools/list, true makes no external call and the audit row is no_manifest. Example: false"
    • changedInput schema / properties / tools / items / properties / inputSchema / description
      Previous value: -"Optional JSON Schema object for the tool. Property names and description strings are scanned; other schema fields are ignored"New value: +"Optional JSON Schema object for the tool. Property names (incl. nested), descriptions, and enum/default/examples/const/title strings are scanned; other schema fields are ignored"
  6. First observed

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes far beyond the annotations (readOnly/openWorld/idempotent/non-destructive): it discloses that tool names and descriptions leave the client, that serverUrl causes this Worker to contact the remote host from Cloudflare rather than the caller, that auditDependencies can send a package name to registry.npmjs.org and manifest text to a paid OSV Actor, rate limits (10/min per host, 60/min overall, in-memory), masking of secrets, refusal of path/packageName, and the PARAPHRASE_GAP limitation. No statement conflicts with the readOnly/openWorld annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loading is good (WHAT/WHEN/WHEN NOT/COST/RETURNS/BEHAVIOR/PARAMETERS/EXAMPLE), but the text is enormously oversized and heavily repetitive: BEHAVIOR re-narrates COST, RETURNS re-enumerates rules and meta fields already implied by the output schema, and grade-scale/severity tables are restated multiple times. An agent must wade through thousands of words to extract the few routing facts it needs.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 19-parameter, multi-surface scanner with an output schema, the description leaves nothing material unexplained: input combinations, error codes, source attribution, grade computation, data-flow reporting, and the free-tier limitation are all covered. Completeness is not the weakness here — verbosity is.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the PARAMETERS section adds genuine meaning the schema cannot express — cross-parameter constraints (INPUT_EMPTY when nothing is passed, INPUT_MIXED_SOURCES when serverUrl is combined with pasted content, baseline vs baselineTools precedence), accepted baseline shapes, and the servers[] toxic-flow semantics. Some of it merely restates schema text (limits, maxItems, aliases), keeping it below a 5.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Opens with a concrete verb+resource statement ("Pre-install check for one MCP server") and then enumerates exactly what surfaces are scanned (tool names, descriptions, parameter names/descriptions, schema enum/default/examples, prompts, resources, SKILL.md, mcpConfig). It explicitly distinguishes itself from siblings by naming osv_audit_dependencies and osv_query_packages as the tools for dependency-only work.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Has dedicated WHEN and WHEN NOT sections: use before installing/enabling an MCP server once you have a tools/list result (as tools, toolsListJson, or serverUrl), or to check a client config for hardcoded keys; do not use for dependency audits (route to osv_* siblings). It also states the tool does not install, start, or execute the package.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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