GenFlick

Read safe summaries of finite human-approved form-lead collections under separate private lead permission

native.genads_lead_collections

DestructiveIdempotent

Read safe summaries of finite human-approved form-lead collections under separate private lead permission. Contacts, answer fields and provider cursors are never available to tools. A human selects the reviewed Page/form, dates, purpose and retention in GenAds. Form permission alone is insufficient.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "work_id": "<work_id>",
      "arguments": "<arguments>",
      "expected_catalog_version": "<expected_catalog_version>",
      "read_skills": "<read_skills>",
      "request_key": "<request_key>"
    },
    "name": "native.genads_lead_collections"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`work_id`	Yes
`arguments`	Yes
`read_skills`	Yes	Exact required native skills and their dependencies, copied from the accepted session bootstrap's skills array. Include only entries in that array. General mcp.* guides and native.{studio}.instructions are guidance, not native skill proofs.
`request_key`	Yes
`publication_proposal_id`	No	For native Social scheduling, the exact server-approved publication proposal. This identifier cannot confer approval by itself.
`expected_catalog_version`	Yes	For a new session, read a studios/{studio}/native/{pack} child toolset and copy invocation.catalog_version from a native tool descriptor. Do not use the top-level library version. For calls in an existing session, use that session proposal's catalog_version.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 5, 2026

TDQS

C2.8/5.0

Behavior1/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description frames this as a read of 'safe summaries' and states that contacts, answer fields and provider cursors are never available to tools, yet the annotations declare readOnlyHint=false and destructiveHint=true. That is a direct conflict an agent will act on incorrectly. The permission-model disclosure is genuinely useful, but the contradiction is the dominant signal.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, front-loaded with purpose, then data-exposure limits, then the human-approval prerequisite. Every sentence carries content and nothing is padded. Minor density in the second sentence but it earns its place by naming exactly what is withheld.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need no explanation, and the permission boundary is well covered. What is missing is differentiation from the singular collection sibling, any parameter guidance for a six-parameter nested invocation, and any reconciliation of the read framing with destructive/read-only annotations.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 50% across six parameters, and the description names none of them: work_id, arguments.account_id, the pagination field 'after', read_skills, request_key and expected_catalog_version are left entirely to the schema. Worse, 'provider cursors are never available to tools' risks being read as conflicting with the 'after' cursor parameter, which is undocumented.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: 'Read safe summaries of finite human-approved form-lead collections'. It is clear what the tool returns conceptually. However, it never distinguishes itself from the very close siblings native.genads_lead_collection (singular), native.genads_lead_forms, native.genads_lead_form_result, or native.genads_deliver_leads, so an agent cannot tell plural-collection listing from single-collection or delivery tools without opening schemas.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives a real precondition — a human must have selected the reviewed Page/form, dates, purpose and retention in GenAds, and 'form permission alone is insufficient' — which tells the agent when the call is legitimate. But there is no explicit when-not guidance and no naming of alternatives among the many lead-related siblings, so selection still requires inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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