fuast

Delete an app for good

delete_app

Destructive

Deletes an app and everything in it: its data, stored files, deploys, schedules and custom domains. This cannot be undone. Only the app's owner can do it, and confirm must repeat the app's slug. Do this only when the person explicitly asks for the app to be deleted.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "app": "<app>",
      "confirm": "<confirm>"
    },
    "name": "delete_app"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`app`	Yes	The app's slug: the first label of its address (my-app for https://my-app.fuast.com). list_apps shows the slugs you can use.
`confirm`	Yes	The app's slug again, to confirm.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`name`	No
`slug`	Yes
`deleted`	Yes
`warnings`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 12, 2026

TDQS

A4.5/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, but the description goes well beyond that: it enumerates the exact collateral destruction (data, files, deploys, schedules, custom domains), states irreversibility ('This cannot be undone'), and names the authorization constraint (owner only) plus the typed-confirmation requirement. These are behavioral facts the annotations do not carry.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three sentences, front-loaded with the destructive scope before the caveats, then irreversibility, then authorization and the guardrail. Every clause carries distinct information and nothing is padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter destructive tool with an output schema and full annotation coverage, nothing an agent needs in order to call it safely is missing: blast radius, reversibility, permission requirement, and confirmation mechanics are all stated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and both parameters are already documented there, including the confirm field's purpose. The description restates the confirm-equals-slug constraint but adds no new syntax, format, or validation meaning, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Deletes an app') and immediately bounds the scope by enumerating what goes with it: data, stored files, deploys, schedules and custom domains. An agent can distinguish this from update_app_files or rollback_app without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit when-not condition: 'Do this only when the person explicitly asks for the app to be deleted.' That is a strong consent guardrail, but no alternative is named for adjacent intents (e.g. resetting or modifying an app), so the routing is implied rather than spelled out as in a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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