FortFi Treasury MCP

invite_agent_cosigner

Invite a co-signer. Agents: pass cosignerUserId (GOVERN / funding-wallet sign when using an agent API key). Humans: pass email — opens instructions for Security UI passkey provision (Turnkey dual-control with MCP DA).

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "invite_agent_cosigner"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`email`	No	Human path: invitee email for Security UI co-signer provision
`nickname`	No	Optional nickname for this co-signer
`challengeId`	No	Governance challengeId from the first call
`cosignerUserId`	No	Agent path: FortFi userId of the agent to invite as co-signer
`walletSignature`	No	Funding-wallet signature over the challenge message

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedNov 3, 2026

TDQS

B3.4/5.0

Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It usefully discloses the agent signing requirement (GOVERN / funding-wallet sign) and the human passkey provision flow, but it does not explain the challengeId/walletSignature workflow, side effects, permissions, or response behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is short and front-loaded, leading with the core action before explaining the two modes. The dense security jargon is justified, though the sentence structure could be slightly more scannable.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a security-sensitive invite tool with five parameters and no annotations or output schema, the description covers the agent and human paths but leaves the multi-step challenge/signature flow and return behavior unexplained. It is adequate but not complete enough to fully guide safe invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the input schema already documents all five parameters. The description reinforces the agent versus human parameter routing, but adds little parameter meaning beyond what the schema already provides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the action (invite a co-signer) and distinguishes two invocation modes: agents using cosignerUserId and humans using email. It is specific about the resource and paths, but it does not explicitly differentiate this tool from the sibling invite_cosigner tool.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives concrete usage guidance for the two modes: agents pass cosignerUserId and humans pass email. However, it does not say when to use this tool instead of invite_cosigner or how it relates to other co-signer invite tools, so the selection context is only partially covered.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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