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Final POS – Custom POS Builder

Update outlet

hub_update_outlet
Destructive

Change the details of one outlet. Takes the outlet id from get_outlets, never a name. Only the fields you pass are changed; the rest are left alone. Renaming is safe and takes effect everywhere, including past orders and reports — they store the outlet id and look the name up. Country cannot be changed here: it belongs to the company. An alias that is already set cannot be changed either and the attempt is refused. Stripe account linking is not editable from here.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cityNo
nameNoNew outlet name
aliasNoOnly settable while it is still empty
phoneNo
stateNoState or province
taxIdNoBusiness tax number printed on this outlet’s receipts (BN / GST / HST / VAT / EIN)
addressNoStreet address
address2NoUnit, suite or floor
outletIdYesOutlet id from get_outlets — not a name
postCodeNoZIP / postal code

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations (destructiveHint=true), the description discloses genuinely useful behavior: partial-update semantics (only passed fields change), that renaming propagates to past orders/reports because they store the id, and that attempts to change a set alias are refused. This meaningfully softens the destructive hint, though it doesn't explain what the destructive aspect actually refers to.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and id rule, followed by the partial-update guarantee and then the constraint list. Every sentence carries information, though the run of constraints could be tightened slightly.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 10-parameter mutation tool with no output schema, the description covers the highest-risk knowledge an agent needs: id sourcing, partial-update behavior, rename propagation, and three non-editable fields. It does not explain the destructiveHint=true flag or any permission requirements, leaving a small gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is already 80%, so the schema documents most parameters. The description adds real value for outletId (source is get_outlets, never a name) and for alias (only settable when empty), matching the baseline of 3 with modest compensation for the remaining coverage gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("Change the details of one outlet") and immediately scopes it against siblings by stating the id source (get_outlets) rather than a name. An agent can distinguish this from hub_create_outlet, hub_update_product, and hub_delete_outlet without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context: obtain the id from get_outlets, and lists three things that cannot be done here (country, an already-set alias, Stripe linking), which steers the agent away from futile attempts. It does not formally name an alternative tool for those excluded actions, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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