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use_secret

Call the fixed HTTPS endpoint configured for a vault binding, with a chosen method and optional body; Fileaify adds the credential on the server and never returns it. Requires an approved secrets.use grant and consumes an authorized use. Returns the service HTTP status and body. Can change data on the external service.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "project_id": "<project_id>",
      "binding_id": "<binding_id>",
      "method": "<method>"
    },
    "name": "use_secret"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyNo
methodYes
binding_idYes
project_idYes
result_offsetNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare openWorldHint=true, readOnlyHint=false, idempotentHint=false, destructiveHint=false, but the description adds real behavioral context beyond them: the credential is injected on the server and never returned, a grant is required, each call consumes an authorized use, and the response is the upstream service's HTTP status and body. The note that it can change data on the external service is consistent with readOnlyHint=false and non-destructive semantics.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and its scope are front-loaded in the first clause, and the remaining sentences carry prerequisites, return shape, and the mutation warning with little waste. Slightly dense punctuation-heavy structure, but no filler sentences.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 5-parameter, open-world mutation tool with no output schema, it covers return values (HTTP status and body) and auth prerequisites well. It is still incomplete on two parameters and does not say whether calls are rate-limited or how failures from the external service surface.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the burden. It explains method (chosen) and body (optional) and ties binding_id to the fixed configured endpoint, but project_id and result_offset are never mentioned, leaving the pagination semantics of result_offset completely unexplained.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: call the fixed HTTPS endpoint configured for a vault binding, with the credential added server-side. That is far more concrete than a generic 'use secret', and it implicitly separates it from siblings like export_secret (which would return the credential). It stops short of naming a sibling explicitly, so it lands at 4 rather than 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Useful preconditions are given: an approved secrets.use grant is required and each call consumes an authorized use, and it warns the call can change data on the external service. However, there is no explicit when-to-use vs. when-not guidance and no pointer to alternatives such as export_secret or request_access for obtaining a grant, so the agent must infer routing.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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