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Set who may connect to a database

set_database_access
Destructive

Replace a Postgres database's allow list, at once. allowAnywhere (or an empty list) lets anyone with the password connect; otherwise only the listed IP addresses or networks (CIDR, e.g. "203.0.113.7" or "198.51.100.0/24"), plus the account's other services when allowServices is true. Anything not on the list is cut off, so check where the apps connect from first.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesThe database's service id, from list_services
allowCidrsNoIP addresses or CIDR networks
allowAnywhereNo
allowServicesNoLet the account's other hosted services connect

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the destructiveHint annotation, it explains exact replacement semantics, that unlisted addresses are cut off, that an empty list or allowAnywhere opens access to anyone with the password, and that allowServices extends access to the account's other services. This is unusually strong disclosure of destructive impact and lockout risk.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with the core mutation, then explains access-list semantics, then closes with a safety warning. The wording is dense but every sentence carries useful information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive mutation with no output schema, the description supplies the key behavioral, safety, and parameter semantics an agent needs before invoking it. Nothing critical is missing for correct use.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already covers 75% of parameters, but the description adds meaningful semantics: allowAnywhere and an empty list both permit anyone with the password, CIDR values support single IPs and networks, allowServices includes other account services, and unlisted entries are excluded.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Replace a Postgres database's allow list, at once.' It is immediately clear that this mutates database access rules, and no sibling tool performs the same allow-list replacement operation.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives clear operational guidance, especially the warning to 'check where the apps connect from first' before cutting off unlisted addresses. It does not name alternative tools, but no sibling appears to be a direct substitute for this access-list operation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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