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Hash or verify a password

hash_password
Read-onlyIdempotent

Hash a password with bcrypt or argon2id, or verify a hash. Returns an htpasswd line when a username is set. The password is not stored or logged. The page in the browser never sends the password; this call only hashes the arguments you send.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
costNoBcrypt cost factor, from 4 to 12.
hashNoExisting bcrypt or argon2id hash. When set, the password is verified instead of hashed.
memoryNoArgon2id memory in KiB.
passwordYesPassword to hash or verify. It is used only for this call and is not stored.
usernameNoOptional htpasswd username. A colon is not allowed.
algorithmNobcrypt
iterationsNo
parallelismNo

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
hashYes
htpasswdYes
verifiedYes
algorithmYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes beyond the readOnly/openWorld/idempotent annotations by disclosing the privacy contract ('not stored or logged', browser never sends the password) and the conditional return shape (htpasswd line when username is set). It does not, however, disclose that bcrypt/argon2id output is salted and therefore not reproducible, which is in tension with the idempotentHint annotation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the primary action and mode switch, then output shape, then the privacy guarantee. The closing sentence about the browser page is slightly defensive but still earns its place as anti-injection context.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an 8-parameter tool with annotations and an output schema, the description covers both operating modes, output form, and the security/privacy contract. The remaining gap — meaning and trade-offs of the Argon2id tuning parameters — is the only substantive omission.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 63%, and the description adds nothing about cost, memory, iterations, parallelism, or the cost/security trade-offs — it only names the algorithm values already enumerated in the schema. Baseline 3 is appropriate since the schema carries most of the load but the tuning knobs are unexplained in both places.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific verb (hash) plus a second mode (verify) on a specific resource (password), with the supported algorithms (bcrypt, argon2id) and the htpasswd output form. This is clearly distinguishable from siblings like generate_password or generic hash_data without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It signals two modes ('hash ... or verify a hash') but never states the condition that selects verify mode (the `hash` argument) — that only lives in the schema. No alternatives (hash_data, generate_password) are named and there are no when-not rules, so usage is only implied.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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