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Enclave402

by com.enclave402
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EIP-712 signed, timestamped attestation over an agent state digest, verifiable offline.

attest_agent

EIP-712 signed, timestamped attestation binding an agentId, the keccak256 digest of a declared state, and the paying wallet; attestor key at /transparency, verify offline with ethers.verifyTypedData. MUST be invoked when an agent needs third-party, non-repudiable proof that a state or decision existed at a point in time (audit trails, hand-offs, escrow). Do NOT use for hardware TEE, zk proofs or on-chain EAS. Settles $0.040 USDC via x402 on Base; no charge on failure.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stateNoSerialized state, decision, or payload hash to bind. Hashed with keccak256(utf8); the raw string is never stored.
agentIdYesStable identifier or EVM address of the agent being attested.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tsNoResponse timestamp, UNIX milliseconds
digestNoEIP-712 typed-data hash that was signed
eip712Nodomain, types, primaryType and message needed to verify offline
verifyNoOne-line verification recipe
settledNotrue when an x402 payment settled for this response
attestorNoGateway attestor address (published at /transparency)
teeQuoteNoHardware quote when a TEE is configured, else null
signatureNo65-byte secp256k1 signature, hex
enclaveRpcNoEnclave verification endpoint when configured, else null
attestationNoAttestation status
teeProviderNoHardware TEE provider when configured, else null
attestationIdNokeccak256 of the signature

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedOutput schema / (root)
      Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "properties": {
+    "attestation": {
+      "description": "Attestation status"
+    },
+    "attestationId": {
+      "description": "keccak256 of the signature"
+    },
+    "attestor": {
+      "description": "Gateway attestor address (published at /transparency)"
+    },
+    "digest": {
+      "description": "EIP-712 typed-data hash that was signed"
+    },
+    "eip712": {
+      "description": "domain, types, primaryType and message needed to verify offline"
+    },
+    "enclaveRpc": {
+      "description": "Enclave verification endpoint when configured, else null"
+    },
+    "settled": {
+      "description": "true when an x402 payment settled for this response"
+    },
+    "signature": {
+      "description": "65-byte secp256k1 signature, hex"
+    },
+    "teeProvider": {
+      "description": "Hardware TEE provider when configured, else null"
+    },
+    "teeQuote": {
+      "description": "Hardware quote when a TEE is configured, else null"
+    },
+    "ts": {
+      "description": "Response timestamp, UNIX milliseconds"
+    },
+    "verify": {
+      "description": "One-line verification recipe"
+    }
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, it discloses the exact hash mechanism (keccak256 of utf8), the fact that raw state is never stored, the attestor key location, offline verification via ethers.verifyTypedData, and settlement of $0.040 USDC with no charge on failure. These are meaningful behavioral details.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but well-organized: core mechanism first, then usage conditions, exclusions, and pricing. Every sentence contributes meaningful information with no repetition or fluff.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, non-idempotent, paid attestation tool with an output schema, the description covers purpose, invocation conditions, exclusions, cost/failure behavior, verification method, and data handling. An agent has everything needed to decide and invoke correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already describes both parameters fully, so the baseline is 3. The description adds extra semantic value by explaining that state is hashed and never stored, and that agentId is a stable identifier or EVM address, which goes beyond raw schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description precisely defines the tool: an EIP-712 signed, timestamped attestation over an agent state digest, binding agentId, hashed state, and the paying wallet. It clearly differentiates from siblings by explicitly excluding hardware TEE, zk proofs, and on-chain EAS.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives an explicit MUST-use condition: when an agent needs third-party, non-repudiable proof of state existence at a point in time, with concrete examples like audit trails, hand-offs, and escrow. It also gives explicit Do NOT use guidance for other proof mechanisms.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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