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Jeevesus — DugganUSA threat-intel MCP

KEV risk by vendor

kev-vendor-risk
Read-onlyIdempotent

Shows where confirmed exploitation concentrates for a vendor or product (Microsoft, Cisco, Fortinet, an appliance, an ERP), for questions like "what should I patch first".

Vendor / product risk matrix built from CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog — where real, confirmed in-the-wild exploitation actually concentrates, not just where CVSS is high.

With no args: returns the top vendors ranked by KEV count (e.g. Microsoft, Cisco, Adobe, Ivanti, Citrix). With {"vendor":"Adobe"}: returns that vendor's or product's known-exploited CVEs (e.g. ColdFusion), most recent first, up to 50, each with a ransomware-use flag (Known or Unknown); kev_count is the full total and truncated says whether the list was cut.

Answers "which vendors/products carry the exploitation risk we should patch first," to assess third-party / supply-chain exposure, or to check whether a freshly-dropped PoC lands on a chronically-exploited product (a proven-soft target) versus a one-off. KEV means CISA has confirmed active exploitation.

Public read (no auth). Source is CISA's KEV catalog, synced daily.

Example: {"vendor":"Citrix"} → NetScaler's known-exploited CVEs; {} → the full top-vendor risk ranking.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
vendorNoOptional vendor or product name (e.g. "Adobe", "Citrix", "SharePoint", "ColdFusion"). Omit for the top-vendor risk ranking.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish read-only, idempotent, non-destructive, closed-world behavior, so the bar is lower — yet the description still adds real value: no auth required, source is CISA KEV synced daily, results are most-recent-first capped at 50, and each record carries a ransomware-use flag plus kev_count/truncated metadata. That is return-shape and operational context the annotations cannot convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Content is front-loaded — the one-line hook, then the data source, then per-mode behavior, then use cases, then auth/sync note. It is somewhat longer than needed: the "what should I patch first" framing appears twice and the KEV-means-confirmed-exploitation point is restated in the second and sixth blocks. Trimming that repetition would tighten it without losing information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With one optional parameter and no output schema, the description carries the burden of describing returns — and it does, covering ranking output, per-vendor CVE lists, ordering, the 50-item cap, the ransomware flag, kev_count, and truncated. Auth requirements and source freshness are also stated, so nothing an agent needs to call this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description exceeds it by explaining that omitting the parameter yields the ranked vendor matrix and that the parameter accepts product names as well as vendors ("an appliance, an ERP," ColdFusion, SharePoint, NetScaler). It clarifies the semantic breadth of a single string field rather than just restating it.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource: it shows where confirmed exploitation concentrates per vendor/product, built from CISA's KEV catalog, and it explicitly explains the two modes (no args = top-vendor ranking, vendor arg = that vendor's CVEs). An agent immediately understands the resource and scope. It stops short of a 5 because it never differentiates itself from the close sibling kev-exploitation-stickiness, leaving the agent to guess which KEV view to pick.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage context is unusually concrete: "what should I patch first," third-party/supply-chain exposure assessment, and checking whether a fresh PoC lands on a chronically-exploited product. That covers multiple when-to-use scenarios. There are no explicit when-not conditions or named alternatives (e.g. kev-exploitation-stickiness, check-package), which keeps it below a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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