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Jeevesus — DugganUSA threat-intel MCP

Check a package before install

check-package
Read-onlyIdempotent

Checks whether a dependency (npm, PyPI, RubyGems or Packagist/Composer, or a GitHub Action used in a workflow) is on the DugganUSA malicious-package deny-list or has published advisories. Suited to a pre-install step in an agent or a CI pipeline, against slopsquatting and hijacked-package attacks.

Returns a crisp, machine-actionable verdict: {ecosystem, package, version, malicious, verdict:"block"|"allow"|"review", reason, advice, source}. malicious:true = the exact package is on our OSV-curated deny-list (230k+ named-not-heuristic entries across npm + PyPI + RubyGems; RubyGems coverage is thin and Packagist has NO deny-list entries at all, so on those two the OSV lookup and reputation signals are the whole check). malicious:false = not on our known-bad list — absence is NOT proof of safety, so still pin and review new deps. If a version is supplied and the entry is version-scoped, the check is version-aware; all-versions-malicious packages block on any version. With a version, it also checks OSV for published vulnerabilities in that exact version (known_vulnerabilities): a reputable package with known CVEs returns verdict:"review", never block.

One tool call, no auth.

Examples: {"ecosystem":"npm","name":"cxp-jquery"} → malicious:true, verdict:block. {"ecosystem":"pypi","name":"requests"} → malicious:false, verdict:allow. {"ecosystem":"rubygems","name":"rest-client","version":"1.6.13"} → RubyGems check, version-scoped. {"ecosystem":"github-actions","name":"tj-actions/changed-files@v45.0.7"} → owner/repo@ref (or name owner/repo + version); the 2025 compromise advisory makes this verdict:review. Pin a full commit SHA for the strongest check.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
nameYesThe package name to check.
versionNoOptional exact version for version-aware checking.
ecosystemYesPackage ecosystem: npm, pypi, rubygems (aliases gem, gems, ruby), packagist (aliases composer, php; name = vendor/package), or github-actions (aliases actions, gha; name = owner/repo or owner/repo@ref, version = the uses: ref: an exact tag or a full commit SHA).

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly/idempotent/non-destructive/openWorld, and the description still adds substantial behavioral context: no auth, one call, the exact verdict vocabulary, the meaning of malicious true vs false, and the important caveat that absence from the deny-list is not proof of safety. It also discloses coverage asymmetries (thin RubyGems, zero Packagist entries) that materially change how the result should be interpreted.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the verdict shape and caveats before the examples, and every paragraph carries information. The examples block is somewhat repetitive of the prose and the parenthetical ecosystem alias detail overlaps the schema, so it is slightly longer than strictly needed.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description fully compensates by spelling out the returned object fields, verdict semantics, and version-aware behavior, plus auth-free operation and coverage limits. An agent can call this and interpret the result correctly without further information.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3; the description goes beyond it by explaining that supplying a version makes the check version-scoped, that all-versions-malicious packages block on any version, and that known CVEs downgrade a reputed package to 'review' rather than 'block'. The github-actions owner/repo@ref convention is covered largely by the schema wording, so the gain is real but partial.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('checks whether a dependency ... is on the DugganUSA malicious-package deny-list') and enumerates the covered ecosystems, so the agent knows exactly what class of question this answers. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from the sibling tools check-repo and check-workflow, which is the one thing keeping it from a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives a clear usage frame ('suited to a pre-install step in an agent or a CI pipeline, against slopsquatting and hijacked-package attacks') and practical guidance to pin full commit SHAs and review new deps. It lacks an explicit exclusion rule pointing at siblings for repo- or workflow-level checks.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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