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DJfindr

Give up a large upload

abort_multipart_upload
DestructiveIdempotent

Give up a large upload. Needs any of profile:write, content:write, inbox:write, bookings:write. Two calls. The first changes nothing: it checks the arguments as the change would (a field this tool does not take is refused, by name) and answers a summary and a confirm_token. Show the summary to the person; only after they agree, call again with the same arguments plus confirm_token.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
file_idYes
confirm_tokenNoLeave out on the first call. On the second call, the confirm_token the first call answered.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, and the description adds real context on top: the required permission scopes, the two-call dry-run protocol, and that the first call mutates nothing while rejecting unknown fields by name. It never says what is actually destroyed (the uploaded parts/partial data) or whether the abort is reversible, which is the one meaningful gap for a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is front-loaded with purpose, then permissions, then the call sequence — the ordering an agent needs. Every sentence carries information, though the parenthetical about refused fields is slightly convoluted for what it conveys.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description correctly explains what the first call returns (a summary and confirm_token), and it covers auth scopes and the confirm flow. Given destructiveHint is already declared, the remaining omission is what state is lost on abort, which would matter to an agent explaining consequences to a user.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 50%: confirm_token is documented in the schema, but file_id has no description at all. The description reinforces confirm_token's workflow role ('call again with the same arguments plus confirm_token') but says nothing about file_id — whether it is the upload ID from start_multipart_upload or a file identifier — so it only partly compensates for the coverage gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Give up a large upload', which unambiguously means aborting an in-progress multipart upload. It doesn't name the sibling tools (start_multipart_upload / complete_multipart_upload), so the agent must infer the contrast from the tool name alone, but the purpose itself is unmistakable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit procedural guidance: call once to preview with no effect, show the summary to the person, then call again with the same arguments plus confirm_token. What's missing is when to abort versus when to finish with complete_multipart_upload, or what to do if the user declines.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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