Dechonet-MCP

Lookalike Domain Check

lookalike_domains

Read-onlyIdempotent

Generate the typosquat/lookalike variants of a domain that phishers actually register — homoglyph swaps (l→1, o→0, rn→m), TLD swaps (.com→.co), character omissions, transpositions, repetitions, hyphenations — and check which of them are currently registered (live NS delegation via DoH). Use this to assess brand-impersonation and phishing exposure for a domain the user is responsible for. A registered variant is NOT proof of abuse (it may be an unrelated legitimate site) — follow up with whois_lookup on each hit for its owner and registration date. Read-only; requires no API key; rate-limited. Returns generated/checked counts and the registered variants with the technique that produced each.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`domain`	Yes	Domain to protect (e.g., 'example.com'), without scheme or path. Variants of its label and TLD are generated and checked.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`kpis`	No	Key metrics as label/value pairs
`grade`	No	Letter grade (A+ to F) when the tool grades the target
`score`	No	0-100 score when the tool scores the target
`issues`	No	Detected problems, severity-rated
`status`	Yes	Overall verdict, e.g. 'good' \| 'warning' \| 'bad' \| 'info' \| 'unknown'
`actions`	No	Recommended next actions, most important first
`summary`	No	One-paragraph interpretation of the result
`reportUrl`	Yes	Human-facing interactive report for this exact lookup on dechonet.com

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already mark the tool as readOnly, openWorld, idempotent, and non-destructive, and the description adds real behavioral context: rate-limiting, no API key required, live NS delegation via DoH, and the important caveat that a registered variant is not proof of abuse. This goes well beyond the structured annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every clause carries critical information: technique enumeration, the live-check method, intended use case, a caveat, follow-up instruction, constraints, and return summary. The core action is front-loaded, and no filler is present.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the single parameter, high schema coverage, rich annotations, and an output schema, the description fully covers what the tool does, how to interpret results, and what to do next. Nothing an agent needs to invoke it correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the parameter description already explains format and constraints. The tool description adds useful meaning by specifying that variants of both the label and TLD are generated, clarifying what the single 'domain' parameter actually drives.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states a specific verb ('Generate') and resource ('domain'), listing concrete variant types (homoglyph swaps, TLD swaps, omissions, transpositions, repetitions, hyphenations) and the registration check. It uniquely distinguishes this tool from all listed siblings, which are generic DNS/network or WHOIS utilities.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly says to use this for assessing brand-impersonation and phishing exposure, and gives a concrete follow-up step with whois_lookup. It lacks an explicit when-not-to-use statement or named alternatives among siblings, but the context is clear and actionable.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Dechonet-MCP tools Inspect

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TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Disambiguation5/5

Each tool targets a clearly distinct diagnostic concern: DNS, SSL, HTTP headers, email auth, email headers, ASN, reverse DNS, WHOIS, ports, subnet math, and the caller IP. The overlapping tools (ssl_check vs http_security vs security_scan) are explicitly differentiated by scope and depth, with cross-references that remove ambiguity.

Naming Consistency5/5

All tool names use lowercase snake_case and follow a consistent noun_verb or noun_noun pattern built around the resource being inspected, such as dns_lookup, ssl_check, port_scan, and whois_lookup. There are no mixed conventions like camelCase or inconsistent verb styles.

Tool Count5/5

13 tools is a well-scoped size for a network/domain/security diagnostic server. Each tool covers a distinct diagnostic capability, and the count is substantial enough to feel complete without becoming bloated or redundant.

Completeness5/5

The tool surface provides broad read-only coverage of domain and network diagnostics: DNS, propagation, WHOIS, ASN, reverse DNS, SSL, HTTP security, email authentication, raw email headers, port scanning, subnet calculation, and an aggregate security scan. There are no obvious dead ends for the stated purpose of domain/network/security investigation.

Resources

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