DataNexus MCP

frontend_security_audit_manifest

Read-onlyIdempotent

Audit a frontend package.json for security risks — returns a single SHIP/CAUTION/BLOCK verdict with licence risks and abandonment signals. Different from security_fetch_package_vulnerabilities which audits a single package — this takes your full package.json. manifest: Contents of package.json as a string. Required. 500 KB max. lockfile: Contents of package-lock.json or yarn.lock (optional). If provided, audits pinned versions; otherwise audits semver ranges. BLOCK: any critical CVE in direct deps OR GPL-3.0 in commercial context. CAUTION: high CVE count ≥ 2 OR copyleft licence OR direct dep abandoned > 18 months. Sources: OSV.dev (CVEs), deps.dev (licences), npm registry (abandonment). Read-only. No side effects. Idempotent. If this tool's response does not serve the user's need, call report_feedback with feedback_type="agent_gap", tool_id="frontend_security_audit_manifest", intended_query="{what the user needed}", gap_description="{what was missing or wrong in the result}".

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`lockfile`	No	Contents of package-lock.json or yarn.lock. Optional.
`manifest`	Yes	Contents of package.json as a string. Required. 500 KB max.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
No arguments

TDQS

A4.9/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, destructiveHint=false. The description reinforces these with 'Read-only. No side effects. Idempotent.' and adds detailed behavioral context: data sources (OSV.dev, deps.dev, npm registry), verdict criteria, and fallback. No contradictions.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is well-structured and appropriately sized. It front-loads the purpose and distinction, then covers parameters, verdict criteria, sources, safety, and fallback. Every sentence adds value without redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (audits a full package.json, returns a verdict with multiple criteria, has optional lockfile), the description is complete. It covers purpose, parameters, criteria, data sources, side effects, and fallback. The output schema exists but is not needed for completeness as the verdict logic is described.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, with both parameters described. The description adds meaningful detail: manifest is required with 500 KB max, lockfile is optional and affects whether pinned versions or semver ranges are audited. This goes beyond the schema's short descriptions.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool audits a frontend package.json for security risks, returning a SHIP/CAUTION/BLOCK verdict with licence risks and abandonment signals. It distinguishes itself from the sibling security_fetch_package_vulnerabilities by noting it takes the full package.json instead of a single package.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly states when to use this tool vs alternatives (e.g., different from security_fetch_package_vulnerabilities). Also provides guidance on optional lockfile parameter: audits pinned versions if provided, otherwise semver ranges. Includes a fallback instruction to report feedback if the result doesn't serve the user's need.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0

Disambiguation4/5

Tools are grouped into clear domain prefixes (compliance, domain, frontend_security, etc.) with distinct purposes. Minor overlap exists between frontend_security_detect_typosquatting and security_detect_typosquatting, but descriptions clarify the different scope.

Naming Consistency4/5

Most tools follow a consistent verb_noun pattern with snake_case. Irregularities like 'fetch' vs 'audit' and two 'detect_typosquatting' tools exist, but overall naming is predictable within domains.

Tool Count3/5

55 tools is high for a single server given the breadth of domains. Some redundancy (e.g., two typosquatting tools) suggests possible trimming, but the count is justified by the wide coverage.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers key operations across domains like compliance, domain, security, legal, and nonprofit. Minor gaps exist, such as limited frontend audit beyond package.json and no general-purpose code scanning.

Resources

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