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frontend_security_audit_ci_pipeline

Read-onlyIdempotent

Scan GitHub Actions, Vercel, or Netlify CI configs for exposed secrets, missing lockfile enforcement, and unpinned dependencies. Paste your config content — no filesystem access required. config: Raw YAML/TOML content of your CI config. Required. 500 KB max. config_type: github_actions (full check suite), vercel, or netlify (secrets only in Sprint 8). Returns risk_level (LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/CRITICAL), findings list with severity and line hints. NOTE: ${{ secrets.FOO }} and ${{ env.FOO }} references are NOT flagged — only literal secret values. Read-only. No side effects. Idempotent. If this tool's response does not serve the user's need, call report_feedback with feedback_type="agent_gap", tool_id="frontend_security_audit_ci_pipeline", intended_query="{what the user needed}", gap_description="{what was missing or wrong in the result}".

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
configYesRaw YAML/TOML content of your CI config. Required. 500 KB max.
config_typeNoCI config type: github_actions, vercel, or netlify. Default github_actions.github_actions

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations provide readOnlyHint, openWorldHint, idempotentHint, and destructiveHint. The description reinforces 'Read-only. No side effects. Idempotent.' and adds important nuance: ${{ secrets.FOO }} and ${{ env.FOO }} are NOT flagged, only literal secrets. Also mentions 500 KB limit. Adds value beyond annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Description is moderately sized but packs essential info. Front-loaded with main action and key details. A few sentences could be streamlined, but no unnecessary words. Well-structured.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given tool complexity (multiple config types, output with risk_level and findings), description covers key behaviors, limitations, and output fields. Mentions the feedback mechanism for gaps. Has output schema, so return values are covered. Edge cases like not flagging template references are addressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline 3. Description adds meaning: config is raw YAML/TOML content, config_type enumeration details (github_actions with full check suite, others secrets only in Sprint 8). Also notes 500 KB max and default value. This enriches the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool scans CI configs for exposed secrets, missing lockfile enforcement, and unpinned dependencies, specifying supported platforms (GitHub Actions, Vercel, Netlify). This distinct verb-resource combination differentiates it from siblings like frontend_security_audit_manifest.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly tells when to use: paste config content, no filesystem access. Provides a NOTE on what is not flagged and a fallback to report_feedback if the result doesn't serve. This includes exclusions and alternative actions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Tools are grouped into clear domain prefixes (compliance, domain, frontend_security, etc.) with distinct purposes. Minor overlap exists between frontend_security_detect_typosquatting and security_detect_typosquatting, but descriptions clarify the different scope.

Naming Consistency4/5

Most tools follow a consistent verb_noun pattern with snake_case. Irregularities like 'fetch' vs 'audit' and two 'detect_typosquatting' tools exist, but overall naming is predictable within domains.

Tool Count3/5

55 tools is high for a single server given the breadth of domains. Some redundancy (e.g., two typosquatting tools) suggests possible trimming, but the count is justified by the wide coverage.

Completeness4/5

The tool surface covers key operations across domains like compliance, domain, security, legal, and nonprofit. Minor gaps exist, such as limited frontend audit beyond package.json and no general-purpose code scanning.

Resources