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Threat Report

threat_report
Read-onlyIdempotent

Query comprehensive threat profile for an IP: Shodan host data, AbuseIPDB reputation, ASN/geolocation, and open ports. Use for IP investigation and SOC alert triage; for domain data use domain_report. Note: nested asn block always returns at most 50 IPv4/IPv6 prefixes — call asn_lookup with include_full_prefixes=True for the full announced-prefixes list. enrichment.vulns is severity-aware list[VulnInfo] (cve_id + severity + cvss_v3) — Phase 2 v1.16.0 BREAKING; pre-1.16 it was list[str] of CVE IDs. Free: 30/hr (costs 6 tokens), Pro: 500/hr. Returns {ip, enrichment, abuseipdb, shodan, asn, threat_level}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
ipYesPublic IPv4 or IPv6 address to investigate (e.g. '8.8.8.8', '1.1.1.1'). Private/reserved IPs are rejected.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover read-only/idempotent safety, but the description adds substantial behavioral details: rate limits (30/hr free, 500/hr Pro, token cost), a breaking change in enrichment.vulns format (list[VulnInfo] vs list[str]), the asn block's 50-prefix cap, and the top-level return keys. This goes far beyond the annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but every sentence carries essential operational info: core purpose, usage context, two critical caveats (asn prefix cap, vulns breaking change), rate limits, and return structure. It is front-loaded with the primary purpose and structured logically, with no wasted words.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (multiple data sources, nested structures, version sensitivity, rate limits) and the presence of an output schema, the description covers all key operational aspects: limitations, version change, rate limit, and the shape of the return object. It is fully sufficient for an agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The only parameter 'ip' is fully documented in the schema (data type, examples, rejection of private/reserved IPs). The description does not add any extra semantics for the parameter itself; it only reuses the concept of IP in the context of the tool. With 100% schema coverage, this is a baseline adequate score.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb ('Query') and resource ('comprehensive threat profile for an IP'), enumerating the data sources (Shodan, AbuseIPDB, ASN/geolocation, open ports). It clearly distinguishes from siblings by explicitly pointing to domain_report for domain data.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states when to use ('Use for IP investigation and SOC alert triage') and provides an explicit alternative: 'for domain data use domain_report.' It also cross-references asn_lookup for full prefix lists, giving clear guidance on related tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, with differences between lookup/search/scan/audit for each domain. However, some overlap exists (e.g., email_mx vs email_security_posture, scan_headers vs contrast_scan) which could cause occasional confusion. Overall, boundaries are well-defined.

Naming Consistency5/5

Tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (e.g., cve_lookup, check_headers, bulk_cve_lookup) with all lowercase underscores. Variations like kev_detail or ssl_check are minor and still predictable. No chaotic mixing of conventions.

Tool Count4/5

54 tools is high but justified by the broad cybersecurity scope (CVE, ATLAS, D3FEND, Sigma, domain, email, IOC, scanning). Some redundancy exists (e.g., three email-related tools), but the count is not excessive given the API's comprehensive feature set.

Completeness5/5

The tool set thoroughly covers the threat intelligence and domain investigation lifecycle: CVE/KEV/exploit/CWE, ATLAS/D3FEND/Sigma, DNS/WHOIS/SSL/subdomains, email security, IOC enrichment, and active scanning. No significant gaps are apparent for the stated cybersecurity purpose.